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Public procurement concerns the purchasing of goods, services and furniture made by the public 
administration. According to the estimates of the European Commission, the public 
procurement market is worth on average approximately 1,900 billion euros/year. For Italy, the 
expenditure for public procurement represents about 10,7% of GDP (in line with the European 
average). These data highlight the incidence of public procurement on the overall public 
expenditure and the need for its efficiency and effectiveness in every country. 
The contracting authority1 (CA) has several choices to take about how to award a contract to 
suppliers. The main one is between auctions and negotiations. In auctions, there is no direct 
bargaining between the public buyer (PB) and suppliers: in a tender - open or restricted - the 
latter must submit their offers to the evaluation of the former. Differently, negotiation is a 
discretionary procedure, as the PB’s evaluation of suppliers also involves subjective 
parameters. Within these two macro-categories, there is a wide range of further options to 
choose, leading to different awarding designs.  
An important part of the supplier’s selection process is represented by the qualification 
mechanisms. Reputational mechanisms assessing suppliers’ past performance work as 
qualification mechanisms: they may represent a strong incentive as a stimulus both for 
improving supplier’s performance and for optimizing the timing in the selection process. 
The PB’s choice about the qualification mechanism is one stage of the procurement process 
where the right balance between restrictions and discretion is key. On the one hand, stricter 
rules to the management of the purchasing process allow to keep the entire process under 
control; more constraints also limit opportunistic behaviour by the supplier and incentives to 
bribe the PB. On the other hand, raising the thresholds on procurement contract value – below 
which PBs’ discretionary choices are allowed – may result in greater efficiency and in speeding 
up the supplier’s selection process. 
In the first part of this thesis, we first illustrate the main awarding procedures in public 
procurement. We then focus on one of the main driver for the efficiency and effectiveness of 
public procurement: the public buyer’s competence. The literature shows that the public 
administration is to be considered not as a single entity, but as a heterogeneous set of multiple 
bodies and subjects, whose level of competence impacts on procurement efficiency. In 
 
1 In this work, the terms “contracting authority” (CA) and “public buyer” (PB) are used interchangeably. 
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particular, this literature highlights the relevance of competence when the PB has a large degree 
of discretion. Empirical results show positive correlation between procurement’s inefficiencies 
(whether “active” or “passive”) and PB’s competence, i.e. larger inefficiency in presence of 
PB’s higher discretion. 
The debate in the literature about PB’s discretion in procurement also refers to the risk of 
corruption, one of the main threats in the standard public procurement process. In this respect, 
recent contributions highlight that the real problem is the low level of competence, and this 
latter comes often associated with a higher risk of corruption in the public administration. 
This problem is aggravated in emergency situations, where the urgency to purchase certain 
goods and services - in a limited time - forces the contracting authority to carry out 
extraordinary procedures. 
To better study emergency procurement, in this work we study which changes have been 
implemented at the Italian and at the European level to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic. We 
use this situation to compare usual regulation on public procurement with the recent emergency 
at a global level. 
In this part of the work, we mainly focus on the exceptions granted by the Italian legal system 
at a regulatory and procedural level. Multiple new laws and decrees have been enacted with the 
aim of offering greater freedom to PBs in responding to emerging needs. Besides, on data 
included in the report conducted by the Italian anti-corruption authority (ANAC), we highlight 
how in the first phase of the emergency (March-April 2020), the use of more discretionary 
procedures has increased dramatically. 
On the one hand, this increase has allowed to respond more quickly and effectively to the needs 
of certain goods (in particular those relating to the health sector); on the other hand, the wider 
use of procedures with fewer advertising requirements highlights a decline in the control 
systems. This is of particular concern, as in such contexts the incentive for opportunistic and/or 
corrupt behaviour represents a relevant issue. 
Finally, we use the interview conducted with the managers of the Procurement Office of the 
University of Padua to draw some interesting considerations. The pandemic has caused major 
repercussions to the economic system, both on the demand side and on the supply side. These 
changes highlight that, in emergency procurement tenders, the central concern for the PB 
becomes the availability of the good. Thus, the additional flexibility results important for faster 
and more effective purchasing process, but it becomes not relevant when the product is not 
available on the market and there are no alternative supply channels. 
Starting from this evidence, we analyse the main effects that the emergency had on the 
purchasing process (i.e. on prices, delivery timing, and quality of goods and services). 
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Combining our findings and the data from the ANAC report, we investigate the topic of 
centralization in the public procurement. On the one hand, we find that a substantial part of the 
procurement expenditure for the emergency is centralized (through central administration 
bodies or aggregators); on the other hand, there is a wide delegation of purchasing activities to 
many central bodies not all used to run procurement procedures. This delegation could result in 
inefficiency, as in emergency tenders, PB’s coordination and bargaining power play a decisive 
role in balancing the criticalities of the procurement process (i.e. higher prices, timing and 
technical requirements not respected, opportunistic behaviour of suppliers, ...). Furthermore, 
exploiting bodies with relevant and competent figures with specific skills in the public 
procurement sector would allow to avoid duplications of human resources and their related 
costs. 
The COVID-19 emergency is not over yet: for a complete analysis of the procurement 
implemented in this period and under the new rules, it will be crucial to look at the overall long-
term data, eventually comparing with the same procured goods in “normal” period and under 
“usual” regulation.  
 
This work is organised into three main parts. In Chapter 1, we look at the main procurement 
procedures available to the PB, and at their costs and benefits considering setting where they 
are applied. Moreover, we discuss the opportunity of introducing a reputation (i.e. past 
performance assessment) mechanism in the suppliers’ selection phase. In Chapter 2, we study 
the effects of discretion in public procurement processes under standard conditions, focusing to 
the role played by the competence of the PB and the risk of corruption. In the last chapter, we 
introduce emergency procurement and discuss how the risk of corrupt practices can increase in 
such a setting. We also analyse the main regulatory and procedural modifications introduced as 
a response to the pandemic crisis, and their effects on the management of the COVID-19 
emergency.  
Finally, thanks to an interview run with the manager of the Procurement Office of the University 
of Padua, we describe and discuss the main elements of procurement procedures and contracts 
implemented by the Office during the COVID-19 emergency. As a final step in the study, 
starting from the interview and from the available data on Italian procurement in the period 
March-April 2020, we illustrate the trade-off between centralization and decentralization in 





















1.1 Awarding Criteria and Auction Procedures 
 
In this chapter we first present the common stages that a typical procurement tender should go 
through; then, we describe the different options a contracting authority can adopt to award a 
procurement contract through an auction procedure or through a negotiation. Finally, we focus 
on supplier’s reputation and past performance as relevant elements of the procurement process. 
As stated in the Italian main procurement regulation (i.e. the so called Codice degli Appalti), a 
typical public tender can be divided into four stages. The initial stage of the procedure consists 
in the preparation of the announcement, in which the buyer defines the specifics of the good or 
service needed, and sets the minimum participation requirements potential bidders must have 
to enter the procedure. These requirements can vary in type and quantity according to the chosen 
mechanism: open procedures allow almost total freedom of entry and have very minimal 
restriction to participation; in restricted procedures, access to the tender is subject to compliance 
with stringent conditions, while in the negotiated ones, participation is subject to invitations of 
the contracting authority. At this stage, in addition to the minimum requirements necessary to 
avoid exclusion, the contracting authority has also to specify the criteria for evaluation and 
selection, through which the various offers will be weighted. In the second stage, the contracting 
authority selects the participants allowed to enter the tender, using the rule previously set. In 
restricted auctions and negotiations, this step is usually preceded by a further phase of pre-
qualification to determine the actual integrity of potential participants and which, regardless of 
the mechanism used, should provide for a minimum presence of candidates (variable based on 
factors such as the country, the value of the tender, ...) to ensure a certain degree of competition 
in the tender itself. Moreover, to limit discretion in the pre-selection phase and to ensure a 
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transparent and fair procedure, the requirements for accessing the tender must be as objective 
and as non-discriminatory as possible (Clarich, 2017).  
The third stage is aimed at evaluating the offers received by the contracting authority from all 
the firms allowed to enter the auction. The main criteria to evaluate bids are based either on i) 
price or on ii) Most Economically Advantageous Tender (MEAT), a combination of price and 
elements of quality. The fourth and final stage in public procurement is related to the actual 
award: the tender commission draws up the final ranking and assigns the contract to the winning 
firm, performing all the bureaucratic and outline controls (i.e. checking the regularity of the 
tender and its compliance with the requirements and correctness of the procedure).  
 
 
1.1.1 Awarding Criteria and Formats  
In this subsection, we discuss the buyer’s choice on criteria to evaluate bidders (adopted in the 
third stage described above). 
There are two general criteria for tenders that can be used in the Italian context: the price and 
the most economically advantage (MEAT). 
When the price criterion are adopted, a direct and objective comparison of the price offered by 
different bidders is implemented, following the auction format adopted. Many methods can be 
used to rank offers, such as first-price auction or average bid auction. Both auction formats can 
be considered based on an objective criterion: they allow the PB to evaluate offers simply by 
comparing the price proposed by the participants in the auction. If the first-price auction is the 
format the buyer chooses, the supplier offering the lowest price will be the winner one. For first 
price auction, an additional check is often required to verify any abnormally low offers, since 
the PB is concerned about the seriousness and sustainability from an economic point of view 
of these offers (Clarich, 2017).  If average-price auction is the format adopted, the bidder who 
has bid closest to the average of the bids submitted wins the auction (it will explain it better 
later). Whatever the chosen price mechanism, by using only one and objective parameter, price-
based auctions have the main advantages of decreasing the time necessary for evaluating the 
offers and facilitating their comparison. 
The criteria based on MEAT has the purpose to select the best combination between price and 
other quality parameters. In this case, a qualitative element – i.e. the execution times, innovative 
methods, or the social and environmental impact - is objectively measured or subjectively 
evaluated (Decarolis and Giorgiantonio, 2014).  
The greater complexity and length of the offer process in MEAT is compensated by a broader 
evaluation of the offers, perhaps allowing to pay a slightly higher price but in exchange for 
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proportionally a greater overall service (Decarolis, 2014). On the one hand, there is an 
advantage in freely choosing the offer deemed most suitable for some specific needs, not 
focusing only on the price offered; on the other hand, it has the danger of opening up to non-
transparent selection mechanisms, leading to less objective judgments and encouraging 
opportunistic behaviour. The MEAT should be accompanied by strict control mechanisms on 
the procedure and the subjects of the contracting commission involved in the evaluation. 
Additionally, the Italian legal system (and not only that one) specifies that with "economically" 
it means both the convenience of the offer in terms of value for money and the cost-to-
effectiveness ratio, such as the cost of the life cycle,2 offering a further opportunity of choice to 
the administration that prepares the call for tenders.  
Whatever awarding criteria is adopted (price or MEAT) the entry in tender can be open or 
restricted.  
The open auction stands out for being the most accessible among the options available to the 
public buyer because, as can be understood from the name itself, it has no access restrictions 
and is open to almost all bidders that want to submit an offer. It has always been the most used 
because, at least in theory, it is the most transparent and least discretionary mechanism among 
the most famous ones and which eliminates from the beginning any discrimination in the 
selection of participants. This is one of the main advantages of choosing an open auction since 
not limiting access to participation in the tender has the objective of combating favouritism and 
collusion between participating companies and the client, making it impossible for the latter to 
create ad hoc requirements and constraints to facilitate certain companies in obtaining the 
contract (Bajari and Tadelis, 2008). 
In the open procedure, the description of the object of the contract must be inserted in the tender 
notice to make it clear to the participants and in order to public this information before the 
submission of the offers. Additionally, all firms know that the requirements contained in the 
announcement will be checked during the evaluation of the offers (Decarolis, Giorgiantonio, 
2014). Open procedures have a high level of competition, due to the large number of 
participants. When a contract is awarded using a first-price auction – i.e. the winning firm will 
be the one offering the lowest price for the product or service awarded – increasing competition 
among the bidders reduces the price paid by the public buyer, representing the main advantage 
of this type of procedure. The less are the requirements of the tender, the greater the number of 
bidders willing to participate in the tender, the larger this advantage. Moreover, a larger number 
of participants prevent the risk of collusive behaviours (that are likely to emerge with few 
 
2 Art.96, Codice degli Appalti. 
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participants), since it is easier for them to reach any agreement aimed at increasing the final 
price. 
The main difference between the restricted and open procedure is in the tender qualification, 
where the requirements for the former make the entry process more complex than the former 
one. The mechanism of the restricted auction, as the name itself implies, limits potential 
participants to those who respect access restrictions, based on criteria that must be as objective 
and non-discriminatory as possible. All potential participants able to clear this requirement will 
be qualified to the next stages: they will receive an invitation letter allowing them to enter the 
tender and to submit their offers. Otherwise, firms not in possession of the appropriate 
requirements are disqualified and cannot proceed beyond that stage. As a result, the call for 
tenders in open procedures tend to necessarily be more specific than those in the restricted ones: 
in the latter, a detailed description of the good or service awarded can be made in the invitation 
letters, while in the former this is not possible. 
This distinction between open and restricted procedure3 almost always does not concern a free 
choice on the part of the contracting authority but is disciplined by precise rules governing when 
and which options are allowed. Often, these rules are linked to criteria such as the overall value 
of the object of the contract to be awarded, or to the service sector to be contracted. Starting 
from 9 January 2020, the new thresholds of relevance for public procurement in the two-year 
period 2020-21 came into force, above which the European Union legislation governing public 
procurement applies. The most important thresholds for EU legislations are € 139.000 for most 
of the supplies and services purchased by central governments and € 5.350.000 for public works 
contracts (Article 35, Codice degli Appalti). 
The rules and thresholds help the contracting authority to select the best award procedure in 
each situation, but the tender design does not end there. In other words, it should determine the 
so-called tender format, i.e. the general set consisting of two main elements, around which the 
organization and setting of the public tender revolve: the award procedure, or the procedure 
through which the public buyer identifies the counterparty with whom to enter into the contract 
for the needed good or service; the award criteria, or the parameters according to which the 
offers are evaluated, which complete the first element and which must be decided in harmony 








1.1.2 First-Price and Vickrey Auctions 
First-price auctions (FPAs) is a mechanism that selects the lowest price offer; it can be adopted 
in open and restricted procedures and used with/without the mechanism of automatic exclusion 
for anomalous bids. FPAs have the advantage of being generally faster than other mechanisms, 
especially selecting the winning bid. Indeed, comparing price, an objective parameter, using an 
almost automatic procedure reduces economic costs (related to the technical commissions or 
other) and help to save time and to increase the level of competition.  
However, the main limits of this format lie in the ease with which it induces improper 
agreements between firms and public administration and between firms themselves. This 
mechanism could increase the risk of corruption, by competing solely on price, it would be 
sufficient for the corrupting company to focus its attention on the objective of obtaining from 
the CA, only the information on the lowest offer, and then subsequently, once the contract has 
been awarded, renegotiate the price through a posteriori agreements (Decarolis, Giorgiantonio, 
and Giovanniello, 2011). There is also a significant risk of collusion between competing firms, 
although FPAs are not the worst possible format in this respect. The main issues lie in the lack 
of non-economic parameters allowing bidders to agree among themselves and to win the 
contract if the company with the lowest costs is within this "group". 
For Italy, Decarolis, Giorgiantonio and Giovanniello (2011) highlighted that, between 2000 and 
2007, FPAs was the favourite option for works with a value above the European Union 
threshold (for those below the threshold legal constraints essentially required the use of other 
mechanisms) and it represented 33% of the value of the total contracts awarded by the public 
administration.  
From this discussion, it clearly emerges that FPAs are especially suitable for tenders in which 
the object of the contract is well defined and whose specifications are clear and linear. This 
situation is recurrent for not very complex projects and for goods and/or services that do not 
require difficult planning and the PBs aim to minimize costs (Bajari and Tadelis, 2001; Dimitri, 
Piga, and Spagnolo, 2006). Projects that have these characteristics are often enforced by fixed-
price contracts, where the payment amount does not depend on resources used and it does not 
vary once it is set.4 First-price auctions, by competing solely on price, are suitable to award 
fixed-price contracts. An additional characteristic of FPAs exacerbated this problem: in 
competitive auctions bidders have no incentive to reveal their actual design costs before the 
auction takes place. As a result, they have additional information on a given project, as 
compared to the contracting authority. This asymmetry information allows firms to offer low 
 
4 Differently, cost-plus contracts refer to contracts’ amount that can vary in order to cover the extra costs, occurring 
after the contract is signed. 
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bids, knowing in advance the problematic parts and the potential pitfalls of a design where they 
can renegotiate and extract extra-profits (Tadelis, 2012). 
There are some variants of the FPAs that have similar characteristics, but that we will not 
explore in details. One of the best-known types is the second-price auction, also famous with 
the name of Vickrey auctions.5 They have the same aim of first-price auctions, namely the 
search for the optimal offer through open or restricted auctions with the use of the lowest price 
criterion. However, the mechanism used is different. In a second-price auction, the firm offering 
the lowest price wins, but the payment this firm receives is equal to the second-bid received. 
This has the advantage of allowing the contracting authority no to consider any so-called 
anomalous individual offers, far apart from rivals. These offers could be synonymous with 
prices that are not bearable for the buyer but aimed at obtaining a subsequent renegotiation 
(Delnoij and De Jaegher, 2018). 
The comparison between these two mechanisms, that do not use any automatic exclusion 
systems for anomalous offers is the focus of various studies - Delnoij and De Jaegher (2018) 
highlight an important aspect to be taken into consideration when selecting the format for 
tenders: the risk aversion or propensity of bidders. This aspect should not be underestimated 
because the choice of the tender format has the power to incentivize bidders to take or not to 
take part in the competition. For example, these authors observe how the first-price auction 
mechanism is preferred by bidders that have increased risk aversion, while in other cases 
bidders are much more likely to be attracted to enter a second-price auction. For other cases, or 
when bidders are almost neutral or in any case have constant risk aversion, Delnoij and Jaegher 
(2018) instead observe an indifference between entering or not. 
 
 
1.1.3 Average Bid Auctions 
Average Bid auctions (ABA) is a format where the bids located in the first and last deciles are 
excluded6 and “the winning bid is the one immediately below an anomaly threshold resulting 
from the sum of the average bid (the simple average of all not-excluded bids) and the mean 
deviation of the bids above said average bid” (Moretti and Valbonesi, 2015). Differently from 
FPAs, this auction mechanism is characterized by the use of the automatic exclusion option for 
anomalous bids. This peculiarity makes this format a sort of random draw to select the winning 
bid because all bids considered too low are automatically eliminated, and therefore they cannot 
be used as a vehicle to win the assignment and then rediscuss the contract terms. The mechanism 
 
5 In honour of William Vickrey, a Professor of Columbia University, who studied and presented it in 1961. 
6 Given the distribution of all the bids received in an auction. 
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aims at finding the right balance between price and credibility of the offer (linked to higher 
costs for higher performances). ABA was the most used for public procurement in Italy: in 
particular for works awarded in the period 2000-2007, it represented 77% of all public tenders, 
even if in terms of the total value, this percentage falls below 50% (see Table 1, from Decarolis, 
Giorgiantonio, and Giovanniello (2011). These data are to be taken with caution because, at 
least until 2006, the Italian Codice degli Appalti obliged its use for all works with a value below 
the threshold. So, it is complex to establish if these results depend on a free choice or on the 
lack of allowed alternatives. Since 2016, the amendments of the Codice degli Appalti have 




ABA could provide bidders with incentive to collusion: bidders may seek a collusive agreement 
to influence the definition of the average price. In fact, focusing on the average of all the bids 
received, the more the number of collusive firms (also through the establishment of fictitious 
companies with this specific purpose), the more their power to influence the selection of the 
winning bid also, making ABAs weak against the risk of collusion (Decarolis, Giorgiantonio, 
Giovanniello, 2011). Differently, ABA help to decrease the risk of corruption: since ABAs offer 
a pretty random process of selection of the winning bid, it will become difficult for a corrupt 
bureaucrat to intervene, affecting the final outcome.  
The use of Average Bid auctions reduces the renegotiations between the winning firm and the 
CA. With ABA, firms will face fewer problems in terms of sustainability of the contract’s 
design and execution costs with respect to FPAs: the price paid by the CA for the awarded 
contract via ABA is generally higher than the one via a FPA, and this is considered by Decarolis 
(2018) one of the main reason behind the evidence showing the average costs of ABA auctions, 
one sixth higher than the FPA).7 At the same time, ABA may not incentivize firms to make an 
 
7 Decarolis, F., 2018. Comparing public procurement auctions. International Economic Review, 59 (2), 391-419. 
Table 1. Number and Value of Awarded Contracts for Each Awarding Procedure 
Source: Decarolis, F., Giorgiantonio, C., and Giovanniello, V., (2011). 
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offer as close to their costs as possible, causing a loss of efficiency both for the CA itself and 
for the overall welfare. Decarolis (2018) states that the use of ABA should be reduced because 
of the inefficiency losses it brings compared to FPAs. 
 
 
1.1.4 Scoring Rule Auctions 
Scoring auctions (SRA) complete the picture of the main tender formats available to the 
contracting authority among auctions procedures (open or restricted) to award a procurement 
contract. This format builds on the most economically advantageous criterion, considering other 
factors than the price. In this format, the use of an automatic elimination tool for anomalous 
offers is superfluous as the offers are analysed on several dimensions and therefore any critical 
issues would already emerge in the evaluation stage (Asker and Cantillon, 2008). In SRAs, a 
score is assigned to each offer and it weights the price and all the quality elements, defined in 
advance in the tender document. The bidder that obtains the highest score has the contract 
awarded. SRAs allow the procurement commission to make an assessment that can include 
more aspects and parameters than just the price. As a result, offers that with other methods 
would have been automatically rejected could now represent the best possible choice for 
achieving the desired final result. This format, exploiting the advantage deriving of evaluating 
the offer from several points of view (analysing both quantitative and qualitative parameters), 
allows to reduce the risk of encountering difficulties in the design and execution phase. Indeed, 
the awarding body can identify any critical elements at a technical level immediately when the 
offers are submitted, assuming that the evaluations are carried out competently and reliably. 
One of the most important parts in setting up an SRA is the definition of parameters that will 
be evaluated in the scoring function, and their relative weight: they should be harmonized 
together with the price variable, as to determine a so-called "scoring rule" that can express a 
score through a single unit of measurement (Dimitri, 2013). 
Examining the technical specifications of the offers already in the preliminary phase allows 
SRA to be among the best mechanisms for complex projects, and they are more efficient than 
competitive auctions in which only the price variable is evaluated (Asker and Cantillon, 2008). 
On the other side, the adoption of SRA for the awarding of simple contracts/projects could 
highlight the presence of corruption (Decarolis, Giorgiantonio, and Giovanniello, 2011). 
Indeed, in SRA, the procurement commission has discretional power in weighting the 
importance of various parameters and in evaluating the suppliers’ offers: this could lead to the 
abuse of power and to an increase in the risk of corruption (Decarolis, Giorgiantonio and 
Giovanniello 2011).  
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Finally, SRA proves to be an excellent obstacle tool for collusion among bidders: the 
multiplicity of elements on which each supplier’s offer is evaluated makes very difficult to 




1.2 Negotiated Procedures 
 
In this section, we consider the awarding procedures based on negotiations. The main difference 
between them is represented by the possibility for the public buyer to negotiate directly with 
one or more bidders to discuss the offer contents. Additionally, a pre-qualification mechanism 
might be included to allow access to the actual negotiation only to some participating firms. 
This pre-qualification mechanism usually consists of a procedure that involves the invitation of 
selected bidders by the contracting authority as the only way to enter the public tender. 
Sometimes, this can be replaced by a procedure where all firms can candidate. But only the 
candidates with the necessary requirements can access the negotiation stage. The negotiated 
procedure represents an important tool in public (and also in private) procurement, useful for 
projects that require high technical skills in the design and execution phase.8 With respect to an 
auction format, the selection of a few but valid competitors allows to create a less complex 
process, avoiding the waste of time and resources caused by a too high number of participants. 
The key element of this format – at the same time an advantage and an issue -  is the greater 
discretion left to the contracting authority, which can autonomously interact directly with the 
participating firms. It offers the opportunity to discuss aspects that otherwise would have been 
subject only to the evaluation and judgment of the public buyer, without giving the possibility 
to find a compromise with the supplier. The whole discipline about negotiated procedures 
revolves around this main concept and advantage. 
 
 
1.2.1 Institutional Framework  
The Italian and EU law governing negotiated procedures defines the conditions under which 
negotiations can be used in a very rigid and unequivocal way, highlighting limits about either 
the value of the contract and the type of asset and/or service object of the tender. According to 
art. 59, co. 2 of the Codice degli Appalti, the negotiated procedure and the competitive dialogue 
 
8 Bajari, Mcmillan and Tadelis (2008), state that in the private-sector non-residential building in North California 
was the most used mechanism (44%) to the detriment also of the open auction (18%). 
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(addressed below in Subsection 1.2.3, and including elements similar to a negotiation) can be 
used only for certain types of works, services and supplies: first, the use of this tool is authorized 
if the subject of the contract implies the use of innovative methods in the design and/or 
execution stages,9 or when the technical or financial nature and/or the complexity of the service 
require prior negotiation so that the terms and requirements of the tender contract are more 
effectively agreed.10 Second, this mechanism can be allowed as a backup plan if an auction 
procedure went void, i.e. it has not selected any winning bidder. In this case, the specifications 
of the tender notice have to be maintained, inviting only the companies in possession of the 
predetermined requirements11  that have previously submitted formally regular offers. In the 
last chapter, we will examine when these requirements can be relaxed. It may occur in case of 
emergency and/or urgent situations, when there is a strong need to speed up and streamline the 
procedures. 
Further constraints, in addition to the ones described above, refer to the economic value of the 
contract: Italian and EU law set thresholds12 for the contract value below which a certain 
contract can be awarded through a negotiated procedure or competitive dialogue. The last 
modification took place through the regulations n.1828 and n.1829 of the European Union, 
applicable from January 1st, 2020. The new EU thresholds are included in Article 35 of the 
Italian Codice degli Appalti; the negotiated procedure is allowed for service and supply 
contracts managed by central government authorities (from €144.000 to € 139.000), non-central 
(set at € 214.000) and for works contracts (€ 5.350.000). Additionally, at the Italian level, the 
so-called "Sblocca Cantieri”13 decree amends art. 36 of the Italian Codice degli Appalti, 
applicable for the contracts under the EU thresholds. It provides for an overall simplification of 
the procedures for tenders and assignments. About the contract value, between 40,000 and 
200,000 euros for works, and between 40,000 euros and the EU threshold for services and 
supplies (which are ordinarily set at € 221.000), the Italian law provides for the award through 
a negotiated procedure with prior consultation of at least 3 participating companies. Instead, 
according to Art.36, co. 2, lett. a, contracts worth less than 40,000 euros can be awarded through 
direct assignment even without prior consultation of two or more economic operators. 
This brief summary helps to shed some light on the consideration that the Italian legal system 
is nourishing for speeding up contracts below the threshold, where the limits imposed by the 
EU law are less stringent. 
 
9 Art. 59, co. 2, lett. a, n. 2, Codice degli Appalti 
10 Art. 59, co. 2, lett. a, n.3 e n.4, Codice degli Appalti 
11 Ai sensi degli Art. 80-90, Codice degli Appalti. 
12 For Italy: D.lgs. 50/2016 
13 Decreto Legge n.32/2019 
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To further highlight the differences within the same type of tender format, also with regard to 
the competitive procedure with negotiation, we can distinguish two important subspecies. They 
differ for the degree of publicity and discretion left to the public administration in the 
preparation and actual execution: on the one hand, we have the negotiated procedure with prior 
publication of the tender notice, through which the contracting authority communicates the 
opening of the tender to the participating firms; on the other hand, we have the negotiated 
procedure without prior publication of the notice. This latter is applicable in particular situations 
and provides that the administration itself can independently identify the firms with which it 




1.2.2 Advantages and Disadvantages of Negotiated Procedures 
In the previous section, we described how auctions are a very cost-efficient allocation 
mechanism for the contracting authority. Various studies highlighted that also a negotiation 
procedure represents an effective solution. Coviello, Guglielmo and Spagnolo (2018), 
investigating a dataset of procurement on public works awarded in Italy in the period 2000-
2005, underline the importance of negotiation: when allowed by the Italian Codice degli 
Appalti, the so-called Trattativa Privata14 (a type of negotiation) is the contracting authority’s 
preferred awarding format. Using a parametric analysis, Figure 1 shows how this type of 
procedure is preferred for below-threshold contracts, with a significant difference with respect 
to above-threshold ones. It implies that the use of negotiated procedure is heavily affected by 
 
14 It is the negotiated procedure in which the contracting authority consults the firms and negotiates the terms of 
the contract with one or more of them. 
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the presence of the thresholds. The same authors point out that this procedure occurs more 
frequently when the number of potential participants is lower than the average.  
Chever and Moore argue that a similar trend is present also in France (see Tab. 215). The table 
refers to the French public procurement tenders between 2001 and 2009. It shows that, on 
average, the number of bidders is lower when a negotiation procedure is applied. Additionally, 
another important evidence is represented by the ratio number of bidders/number of candidates: 
this parameter is much lower in the negotiation procedure (0.33) rather than in the open auction 
one (0.8).  
 
The relationship between the number of participants and the mechanism used is subject of 
conflicting opinions and studies (Bajari, Mcmillan and Tadelis, 2008; Lalive, Schmutzler and 
Zulehner, 2015). Nevertheless, some factors suggest there are benefits in having a lower number 
of participants in the tender. First, when the PB uses a negotiation to select some firms, usually 
the selected firms are bidders who have skills and competencies to carry out and discuss the 
required project. Second, a lower number of bidders require less time to evaluate the offers. 
 
15 Tab. 2. Chever, L., Moore, J. 2012. When More Discretionary Power Improves Public Procurement Efficiency: 
An Empirical Analysis of French Negotiated Procedures. Working Paper, IAE Paris, Paris. 
Figure 1. Trattativa Privata Below and Above-threshold 
Table 2. Number of Bidders and Awarding Procedure 
Source: Chever, L., and Moore, J., (2012). 
Source: Coviello, D., Guglielmo, A., and Spagnolo, G., (2018). 
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This allows the contracting authority to save time and resources which would have been needed, 
in an open auction, to evaluate a higher number of participants. To maintain an adequate level 
of competition, the Italian law requires a minimum number of participants, i.e. three (Coviello, 
Guglielmo, and Spagnolo, 2018). Additionally, the candidates must submit offers that include 
various non-monetary characteristics of the good/service provided, and not just the price. As 
the contract awarding is not price-based only, anomalous offers – i.e. opportunistic bids firm 
offer with the sole purpose of renegotiating them after the tender has been awarded - are rarely 
observed. Similarly to scoring auctions, the PB is interested not only in the cost for the 
realization of a specific project, but also on multiple non-monetary aspects. Indeed, in a first-
price auction, the minimization of costs is the unique factor used to judge a public work or a 
public service. Differently, in scoring rule auctions as well as in negotiations, the main goal is 
the maximization of the "value for money". Through negotiation or a competitive dialogue, by 
discussing the offers from many dimensions, - such as the environmental impact, the local 
business participation or the effects of the project on the population and so on – this goal may 
become easier to achieve (Manso and Nikas, 2015).  
The small number of participants reduces competition between bidders, in turn lowering the 
possible gain that can be obtained from the contracting authority (Baltrunaite, et al., 2020). On 
the one hand, on average the prices are higher than those achievable using other allocation 
mechanisms (Bulow and Kemplerer, 1996); on the other hand, an increase in the number of 
bidders may lead rational bidders to bid less aggressively (because of the fear of the so-called 
winner’s curse). As a result, bids are not necessarily decreasing in the number of bidders, and 
not even necessarily lower with competitive auctions (Lalive, Schmutzler and Zulehner, 2015). 
There is also, in the economic literature, a wide debate about how and when negotiation 
procedures should be used. Various studies have observed how negotiations are the most 
appropriate procedure when dealing with complex projects (Bajari, Mcmillan and Tadelis, 
2009; Chever and Moore, 2012; Dimitri, Piga and Spagnolo, 2006). Those studies highlight it 
exists at least a positive correlation between the complexity of the project and the choice by the 
public buyer of a negotiated procedure. Various factors explain this relationship. Most 
importantly, the literature points out that the higher the complexity of the project, the greater 
the difficulty in evaluating offers solely on the basis of the price. Indeed, the price is a decisive 
element for simpler projects, when the technical requirements and the ways in which the work 
will be performed can be sufficiently determined ex-ante. In the relationship between the 
complexity of the project and the tender format, the type of contract used to govern the 
agreement plays a relevant role. This represents a crucial element in the procurement process: 
the contract states the purpose the CA wants to achieve and it is a protection itself from any 
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opportunistic behaviour of the winning bidder. Complex projects are often enforced by the cost-
plus contracts. Cost-plus are contracts where the contractor is paid for all its allowed expenses, 
plus an additional percentage to provide the contractor with a profit.16 This type of contract is 
preferred when the contracting authority would aim to balance the desire to offer incentives to 
companies in improving the execution of work with the need to reduce as much as possible ex-
post transaction costs (Bajari and Tadelis, 2001).  
Alternatively, the contracting authority can use fixed-price contracts, where the contractor is 
paid a pre-determined amount, regardless of the incurred expenses. Fixed-price contracts are 
the optimal solution to reduce the costs related to the execution of the project (to be preferred 
for less complex projects). Differently, they turn out to be a poor choice if the project itself is 
not completed, if there are many non-contractible parts, or if the project has to undergo 
substantial changes to its original structure. This happens because renegotiation costs have a 
significant impact on the overall economic burden to be borne (Bajari and Tadelis, 2001; 
Gagnepain, Ivaldi and Martimort, 2013). Renegotiation becomes more likely with complex 
projects, whose initial definition usually undergoes major changes during construction. Indeed, 
the difficulty to precisely determine ex-ante the multiple aspects and technicalities of a project, 
forces the counterparties to modify it during its execution, increasing the costs of ex-post 
adaptation. Additionally, these corrections and interventions lead to delays in the execution of 
the work, and delays increase probability of not finishing the work. To reduce the risk of these 
problems, PBs prefer to select reliable firms through a negotiation stage (Bajari, Mcmillan and 
Tadelis, 2009). In this way, the mechanisms for limiting ex-ante costs are reduced but, at the 
same time, the renegotiation and adaptation process ex-post becomes more agile and simple 
(Bajari and Tadelis, 2001). If coupled with appropriate contractual clauses, the negotiated 
procedure could become a good solution even for high-value projects, usually assigned through 
a competitive auction. 
The above considerations highlight one of the toughest problems to resolve in the relationship 
between seller and buyer: the adverse selection. It arises from the difference in knowledge 
between who prepares the tender and the participating bidders. The latter, working in a certain 
industry or specific field, are usually much more experienced than the public officials 
evaluating the offers. Adverse selection is particularly relevant when a competitive bidding 
mechanism is used for complex projects: if the contractor notices any pitfalls in the design he 
could exploit them to his advantage. It may offer a price lower than the real value of the contract 
 
16 Cost-plus contracts are created to protect clients from cost overruns. They are commonly used in situations 
where the costs are difficult to define ex-ante. Many contracts specify that reimbursement may not exceed a 
specific threshold, in order to limit any opportunistic behaviour. 
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and then make the necessary changes once the contract is assigned. In this way, he would obtain 
extra profits from the renegotiation, and consequently extra costs for the contracting authority 
(Bajari, Mcmillan and Tadelis, 2008).  
Adverse selection is not only linked to the information and skills advantages that bidders have, 
compared to the public contracting authority. All players, the PB and the bidders, are unwilling 
to share in-depth details on the tender project before the agreement is reached. The contracting 
authority aims to provide the proper set of incentives to balance the need of lowering the initial 
price with the risk of spending too much for the ex-post adaptations (Tadelis, 2012). A bidder 
could prefer not to expose an issue of the project in order to exploit this knowledge in a 
renegotiation at a later stage. Through the use of a negotiated procedure, these concerns of 
pointing out possible weaknesses of the project may be limited. Thanks to the direct 
confrontation between the parties, it will be easier to obtain an effective solution. Negotiations 
may also leave room for improvement of the project, avoiding waste of public resources and 
encouraging firms to contribute to the final result (Tadelis, 2012; Chever and Moore, 2012). 
The advantages of negotiated procedure are not limited to this point. Negotiation strengthens 
the relationship created between the contracting authority and private companies. Unlike 
competitive bidding like auctions, where the parties are limited to the mere formality of 
presenting and selecting offers, in the negotiation, the parties must interact and cooperate, 
adapting the proposal of one with the request of the other, and vice versa. The common 
denominator is the recognition of a dependence on the counterpart: as a result, factors such as 
cooperation and mutual adaptation become decisive elements for the success of the agreement 
and of the negotiation process (Manso, Nikas, 2015). This type of relationship may be not only 
an efficient mechanism for allocating the public procurement, but it can be useful also to create 
a long-term relationship between the buyer and the supplier. Thanks to the exchange of skills 
and information, the buyer learns the supplier’s ability, and take it into consideration in future 
tenders (Gagnepain, Ivaldi, Martimort, 2013). 
 
 
1.2.3 Competitive Dialogue 
To reinforce professional collaboration between the contracting authority and tenderers, another 
alternative type of procedure increasingly used in Europe during the last years is the competitive 
dialogue. Competitive dialogue aims to increase effectiveness and efficiency in the contract 
management by the public administration, even in the preliminary stages preceding the 
presentation of the tender notice. The competitive dialogue is a variant of the negotiated 
procedure. It differs in the way parties conduct the negotiation. Indeed, the parties involved 
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must not only seek an agreement and discuss a defined tender notice (as in the negotiations), 
they have also to cooperate with the aim of writing a notice as complete as possible, analysing 
aspects and variables, outside the rigid bureaucratic process (Racca and Casalini, 2012). It 
involves three steps: first, a preliminary selection of the companies (at least three operators) 
who can take part in the dialogue through invitation or pre-qualification mechanisms. Then, the 
dialogue stage, where the real negotiations take place. Here, the contracting authority can 
choose whether to run the negotiations with each participant separately (safeguarding the 
respect for confidential information and property rights) or all together jointly (eliminating the 
problem of information asymmetry that may arise in the negotiation). Finally, once the dialogue 
stage is completed, there is a final tender stage. In this last stage, the contracting authority 
invites each bidder to submit its final offer, according to the solutions presented and specified 
in the dialogue stage. Offers can be clarified, specified and refined. However, the details, 
clarifications, improvements, and additional information cannot have a discriminatory effect, 
altering the competitive mechanisms (see Art. 64, comma 10, Codice degli Appalti). The 
competitive dialogue aims to reconcile the need for flexibility with the legal and economic 
constraints dictated by the principles of competition and transparency.  
This awarding procedure is particularly useful when the contracting authority is not able to 
independently establish the requirements and technical specifications of the object of the tender. 
This situation occurs when the complexity of the projects is quite high and a direct exchange of 
views with the companies operating in the sector of interest may be useful (Clarich, 2017). 
Indeed, unlike negotiation, in the competitive dialogue PBs are allowed to discuss with the 
bidders before the tender is defined. Additionally, this procedure is very useful for the 
contracting authority to issue a tender as complete and exhaustive as possible.17 The use of 
competitive dialogue is limited to "particularly complex" contracts, where the needs of the 
public administrations and its legal and/or financial aspects necessary to satisfy them would be 
complicated to determine before the awarding phase (Racca and Casalini, 2012). The award 
criterion will consequently be the most economically advantageous one.18 The CA will be able 
to examine and evaluate all aspects of the offers received, using also the preliminary discussion 
with the bidders: they can even help define the technical specifications to submit in the decision 
on the contents of the offer. 
The main contribution offered by the competitive dialogue is the increase, with respect to a 
standard negotiation, of competitiveness in a phase of the awarding procedure under the 
exclusive competence of the contracting authority. The main risk of this procedure is the PB’s 
 
17 Art. 64, co. 5, Codice degli Appalti 
18 Art. 64, co. 10, Codice degli Appalti 
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lack of skills and technical knowledge of the goods or service to be procured, as compared to 
the firms providing it. This gap may lead to inefficiencies in pre-assignment, high transaction 
costs and ex-post renegotiation (Decarolis and Giorgiantonio and Giovanniello 2011; Sharma, 
2016). Despite the risks of non-objective lending, the competitive dialogue may represent "a 
structured, formalized and transparent procedure to define the technical specifications for 
complex public contracts. Additionally, it will be useful to prevent the distortions that may 
otherwise occur at this stage and undermine the policy goals of public procurement" (Racca 
and Casalini, 2012, p. 490). 
Another limit of the main limitations of the competitive dialogue is the duration of the whole 
pre-assignment discussion process: since this procedure is composed of several dialogues and 
evaluation stages, in 67% of the times it lasts from one to two years while one time out of four 
– generally in case of highly complex projects19-  it will exceed two years (European PPP 
Expertise Centre, 2011). In addition to being expensive in terms of the time and efforts to devote 
to each project, this procedure creates an important opportunity-cost for bidders who have to 
give up other projects; additionally, bidders have to finance the multiple stages of the discussion 
involving the various areas of competence of the contract. To mitigate this disadvantage, 
sometimes a system of incentives and reimbursements is inserted at the discretion of the 
contracting authority. For example, losing bidders may receive some reimbursements, in order 
to encourage participation and sharing of the know-how and, for the public buyer, to acquire 
property rights on relevant non-winning projects or ideas (Racca and Casalini, 2012). 
Although the negotiated procedures and the competitive dialogue could be considered less 
effective tools in selecting the lowest bid, this section highlights how these solutions may 
represent an important source of advantages for the public buyer. Their positive implications 
may exceed the benefits of the auction. On the one hand, negotiations, taking advantage of the 
possibility of analysing all the multiple elements of the offer, minimize the costs to be incurred 
to correct errors ex-post; on the other hand, an auction can better address the need of transparent 
procedures possible to avoid favouritism and opportunistic behaviour (Tadelis, 2012; Manso 
and Nikas, 2015). A possible solution would be to find an option that allows to evaluate and 
select the best suppliers, before entering the tender. To achieve this objective, the PB can exploit 
information regarding the suppliers’ past performances, like their credibility and their 
reputation. Using past performance as a criterion, it may act as a filter and qualifying parameter 
to simplify the choice between different competition formats. 
 
 





1.3 Reputation and Past Performance in Selection Process 
 
The previous sections show that it is not possible to establish which is the best tender format, 
between auctions and negotiations. Each one has its specific advantages and issues: each one 
may be the best in certain areas and for certain situations while it may be harmful if used in 
inappropriate contexts.  
There are two main variables to consider in selecting the appropriate mechanism: efficiency 
and effectiveness. Their role is crucial and they should be the main purpose of every decision-
making process that weight costs and benefits. In the public procurement sector, efficiency is 
often traded for other values and principles the public administration has to pursue. Among 
them, the need to ensure transparency and honesty and the prevention of opportunistic 
behaviour are the most important. Their interplay may lead to different outcomes and risks. All 
these aspects are relevant in any competitive environment and particularly in operations 
conducted by public administrations. In this case, the consequences of certain actions do not 
fall only on the public official in charge. Any errors (voluntary or not) lead to responsibilities 
towards external subjects, such as citizens and firms. Furthermore, errors can cause long-term 
effects in the relationship between institutions and citizens, undermining the trust of the latter 
in the former.  
This section aims to study the trade-off between the obligation to comply with all the values 
and principles the public administration has to pursue and the need of efficiency in public 
procurement. When weighting efficiency and transparency, the level of discretion left to the PB 
is one of the main decisions to be taken. For example, Moretti and Valbonesi (2015) have 
pointed out a greater propensity towards the rigidity of the rules to regulate awarding procedures 
could limit the decision-making freedom of the contracting authority. In turn, this may decrease 
the efficiency of operations and collective well-being (even if the authors underline the 
surprising lack of empirical works that could allow to estimate this loss in terms of inefficiency). 
A solution that has been proposed to solve this trade-off is the use of reputational or past-
performance rating mechanisms in the selection of suppliers. They may help the contracting 
authority in streamlining the awarding procedures, and in increasing the quality and reliability 
of these processes. This option becomes particularly relevant in auctions procedures, where the 
PB has no discretion in assessing the quality and the reliability of bidders. Differently, in 
negotiated procedures, all bidders (and their offers) are individually evaluated in the direct 
discussion between PB and suppliers during the negotiation (or in the second stage of the 
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competitive dialogue, see the previous section). This does not mean that these tender formats 
may not benefit from a possible reputational assessment system of bidders, eventually avoiding 
the need to carry out additional checks. 
The reputational mechanisms use the past performance outcome to assign a score to the bidders. 
When a bidder complies with the contracting authority’s requirement about certain parameters, 
it will receive a high score which will be taken into consideration for future tenders. In this way, 
the bidders have an incentive to improve or consolidate their performances. Otherwise, they 
will be penalized with a negative score, decreasing their chances to access future tenders. These 
reputational scores can be used in the pre-qualification stage (if present) of open and restricted 
auctions, before the formal evaluation stage and the final awarding of the contract. This step 
helps the PB in adopting filtering and evaluation systems before the submission and the 
evaluation of the offers. Using the past experiences of suppliers, the contracting authority may 
discard companies with a worse rating. This mechanism of incentives and penalties reward 
more reliable firms with a higher probability of obtaining future projects, and incentivize the 
excluded firms in making the necessary corrections to improve their ratings. 
 
 
1.3.1 Regulatory and Institutional Framework 
The regulatory framework for the use of past performances in evaluating public procurement 
offers changes according to the procurement regulations of each country. In particular, there 
are important differences between the European Union and the United States. In the latter, the 
most important contribution in supporting more flexible practices is represented by Kelman.20 
He argued that a bidders’ rating mechanism could bring advantages both for the contracting 
authority and for the private companies that interface with it. He pushed for a reform of the U.S. 
system: through the Federal Streamlining Act of 1994, public administrations were allowed to 
use less rigid procedures, increasing the weight assigned to the past performances of suppliers 
in the selection process. Then, these ratings had to be recorded in order to make them usable in 
the subsequent selection procedures (Spagnolo, 2012). Using past performances to improve 
future ones leaves the procedure open to all firms in the selection stage, introducing this 
parameter as an award criterion parameter. These mechanisms have been already used in the 
 
20 Kelman (1990) stated that a too high degree of competition discourages a normal business relationship between 
public and private agents. It would not allow to create a long-term relationship with suppliers, unless they 
disappoint the expectations. Kelman underlined how in the public procurement system, public decision-making 
processes do not exploit factors such as the expertise, the reputation, or the efficiency of the suppliers in the 
selection of the most appropriate bidder. 
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private sector, where reputation, rather than the threat of legal retaliation,21 may act as a 
guarantee for the respect of the contracts. They should incentivize firms to respect the reliability 
requirements autonomously, to increase the chances of success in the negotiation phase (Doni, 
2006). The important changes suggested by Kelman have raised a wide debate on their 
effectiveness: in particular, the need to safeguard the competitive environment and not to 
discourage potential participants is of particular concern. Horner (2002) argues that the 
interaction between reputation and competitive forces can be advantageous only if past 
performances are used effectively (Horner, 2002).  
Differently from the US, the European Union does not allow the use of past performances and 
firm’s reputation in the awarding mechanism. The main reason of this choice is to preserve 
open competition, and not to disadvantage potential entrants. When the evaluation of past 
performances is not well-designed and managed, it might have discriminatory effects: 
incumbent firms will have more chances to access future tenders because they have an already  
established score; differently, it would be tough for new entrants – particularly from different 
countries – to build a good reputational index starting from scratch. EU Member States are 
allowed to use a reputational index or past performance parameters only in the selection stage, 
while the award criteria must only consider the elements contained in the offers. This EU rule 
aims to limit the use of discriminatory parameters against non-national but EU suppliers. In this 
way, it favours the integration and harmonization between the different legal systems, at the 
cost of a lower-quality procurement and to an increase in transaction costs (Calzolari and 
Spagnolo, 2009; Doni, 2006; European Economy Review, 2006). 
The Italian legal system, following the European directives, provides for the use of preliminary 
screening mechanisms that are not linked to past performance evaluation indexes. These 
screenings are limited to check the presence of technical, legal, and financial requirements of 
the bidder. They are used to qualify bidders for entry: only those who obtain the qualification 
can perform and complete all the tasks and activities in the public tender. In particular, bidders 
wishing to participate in a call for tenders must have a certification by an authorized body 
(SOA22), concerning the size and economic value of the contract and the type/scope of technical 
work or service requested. Other additional controls concern the financial capacity of the 
company or the presence of any links with criminal associations) (Branzoli and Decarolis, 
2015). Bidders that do not meet these requirements can still submit an offer and bid to win the 
 
21 Legal enforcement of the contracts often represents the last resort because of the costs it involves, both from an 
economic point of view and for the times of justice. 
22 SOA (Società Organismo di Attestazione). The SOA Certification qualifies the firms for the execution of public 
works contracts for an amount greater than 150,000 euros and it confirms that a firm is in possession of all the 
requisites necessary for public bargaining. 
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contract. But, if they win, they must subcontract the activities for which they do not qualify to 
other qualified companies (Moretti and Valbonesi, 2015).23  
A recent legislative change may suggest a new attitude of the Italian legislator. The latest 
amendment to the Codice degli Appalti (L.D. 50/2016) allowed the use of a bidder rating system 
based on past performance in the awarding phase. The actual use should be optional and not 
mandatory for contracting authorities and its effectiveness is not yet assessable24 (Fiorino et al., 
2018). Setting up actual requirements to evaluate the bidders is necessary for the practical 
application of this new rule. At the moment, these requirements refer to technical, legal and 
financial aspects of the firm, they do not give a significant relevance on how the firm has 
operated up to that moment and they do not focus on the evaluation of the firm’s behaviour in 
previous contracts.  
Furthermore, the classic auction theory assumes that it exists the so-called “verifiability of the 
performance”: the client is able to check for any leaks in the execution of the contract and, if 
necessary, retaliate against the other party. But, this assumption is not always true: verifiability 
is not feasible when the cost of controls and retaliations is higher than the possible gains 
deriving from a win - or if there is a limit to the reimbursement of the damages. The contracting 
authority often does not sue a contractor because litigation can take a very long time and 
produce uncertain results. With such conditions, the enforcement of the contract is difficult to 
respect, and the injured party risks not having tools to protect against any opportunistic 
behaviour of the counterparty.  
In particular for high complex projects, it is difficult and sometimes impossible to define a priori 
all the aspects of the work or service to be provided. This creates uncertainty about how to 
verify compliance, making non-contractable variables an important aspect to keep into account. 
It becomes necessary to find an alternative option that can weigh in future tenders any past 
incorrect behaviour, acting as a deterrent for the latter. Inserting a parameter that gives to these 
behaviours a negative relevance could reduce bidders’ opportunistic behaviours. Indeed, the 
evaluation of past performances may be defined as the creation of a history of the firm which 




23 The subcontracting practices are another relevant aspect when we talk about public procurement. The bidders 
can be divided in fully qualified bidders and partially ones. The possibility to submit an offer even if the bidder is 
not qualified for the activities creates different subcontracting strategies. For example, it emerged how firms that 
have to mandatory subcontract (because not in possession of the requirements) offers higher prices than the ones 
who are not forced to do it (Valbonesi, 2012). It will be mentioned later about the impact of subcontracting on 
corruption. 
24 As the specific guidelines have not yet been defined by the competent authorities. 
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1.3.2 Reputation, Competition and Collusion 
The incompleteness of contracts represents one of the key issues in the public procurement and 
it is heavily related to the moral hazard problem and adverse selection. It arises within the 
relationship between the contracting authority and private agents: the latter may adopt 
opportunistic behaviours through very aggressive offers; those offers have the sole objective of 
winning the contract and then renegotiate ex-post to obtain extra profits, exacerbating the 
problem of public administration inefficiency. When auctions are used as awarding procedures, 
any bidder can exploit these opportunistic behaviours. They may occur once the contract has 
been obtained (ex-post) but also in the selection phase (ex-ante). In the first case, the winning 
bidder wins the auction offering a very low price for the execution of the work. The low price 
is linked to low quality, complicated and/or expensive to control for the public buyer. This 
allows the supplier to force changes to the original contract, by re-discussing its terms to bear 
the costs of higher quality ex-post (Gagnepain, Ivaldi and Martimort, 2013). In the second case, 
a bidder offers a very low price in the bidding stage: once it wins the contract, it will offer a 
low-quality performance in line with the price offered. For the contracting authority, these 
negative outcomes highlight a wrong allocation, not leading to the selection of the most efficient 
bidder (Calzolari and Spagnolo, 2009; Dellarocas, Dini and Spagnolo, 2006). Through the 
adoption of a reputational filter, behaviour of this kind could be curbed and sanctioned in future 
tenders. In this way, the bidders should evaluate the costs of their opportunistic behaviour also 
in the long-term: offering low-quality performances, bidders know in advance they will 
decrease their ratings, decreasing also the probability to obtain future contracts.  
The evaluation of past performances works only if the amount of “promised” future profits – 
i.e. the increase in the probability of winning future contracts if there is no opportunistic 
behaviours now - is higher than the immediate profits obtained by cheating and altering the 
competitiveness of the tender.25 Otherwise, bidders do not have any incentives to comply, and 
the use of excessively aggressive offers would not undergo any significant correction. 
The inclusion of further restrictions on access to the awarding procedures is of particular 
concern: it could decrease competition between potential bidders. The relationship between 
participation and reputation has been investigated by Butler et al. (2012).26 They conducted an 
experimental study evaluating the quality, costs, and frequency of entry before and after the 
introduction of a reputational mechanism in the qualification stage. They noted that the 
 
25 Kim, I.G., 1998, A model of selective tendering: does bidding competition deter opportunism by contractor?. 
The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 38, 907–925. In: DONI, N., 2006. The Importance of Reputation 
in Awarding Public Contracts. Annals of Public Cooperative Economics, 77(4):401–429. 
26 In Spagnolo, G., 2012. Reputation, Competition and Entry in Procurement. International Journal of Industrial 
Organization. 30 (3), 291–296. 
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introduction of this policy reduced participation in tenders only when the mechanisms favours 
a single historical operator. Differently, if potential competitors have a similar reputation and 
are equally subsidized, these authors find no difference with the “no-reputation scenario”. As a 
result, the work shows that utilizing a performance rating does not led to a decrease in the level 
of competitiveness and to a lower number of participants. Participation depends on how these 
exclusion systems are designed and applied, without setting discriminatory or unobjective 
criteria that make the process excessively arbitrary and favourable only to some bidders (Butler 
et al., 2012; Spagnolo, 2012). Moreover, even if this type of reputational filter actually resulted 
in the skimming of potential participants, the overall result would not necessarily be negative. 
When direct negotiation is not allowed, weighting the past performance quality of suppliers 
may represent an effective alternative to mechanisms that focus only on the contents of the 
present tender. On the other hand, mechanisms that limit open competition in public 
procurement are often the cause of heated debate, due to the incentive they could create in 
favouring collusion between bidders. With fewer companies competing for the contract, 
reaching a collusive agreement to extract extra-profits becomes easier. However, a compromise 
between reputational and collusive mechanisms is possible. When the quality - in particular its 
non-contractable part - is particularly relevant for the public buyer, limited competition in the 
awarding stage may be desirable. In specific cases,  not contrasting collusive agreements may 
even be beneficial for the contracting authority and the overall quality of the project (Calzolari 
and Spagnolo, 2009). It is difficult to include this concept in national regulations: in some cases, 
potential suppliers may cooperate by creating special associations in order to win the contract. 
Collusion may allow the supplier to obtain large profits but also, consequently, to offer superior 
performance. These considerations on the relationship between reputation and collusion are 
based on an unstable balance between the non-contractual parts and the level of openness 
towards suppliers that a system wants to adopt: on the one hand, a greater number of bidders 
and greater importance about the explicit parts of the contract have the advantage of limiting 
collusive agreements between the bidders; on the other hand, this may reduce quality and 
execution of the non-contractual aspects of the contract (Calzolari and Spagnolo, 2009). 
 
 
1.3.3 Suppliers’ Selection Effects on Costs and Quality  
The use of a mechanism that links past with future performances may also trigger a virtuous 
circle. A bidder with a good reputational parameter increases its chance of success. The only 
way to improve this rating is by offering services that are qualitatively up to date. Clearly, this 
is true also for future contracts, that become increasingly likely to be obtained, and so on. 
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Maintaining a high and constant level of quality in the execution of the works, a bidder would 
see an increase in its rating, linked to its performance. To achieve this goal, bidders will be 
more inclined to self-regulate in the selection stage. They will be forced to invest in adapting 
themselves to the required standards. In this way, they would be more likely to win contracts 
and to build or consolidate their reputational index. Among the downsides, these behaviours 
may increase the costs for the bidders, translating in a higher price paid by the public buyer 
(Decarolis, Spagnolo, and Pacini 2016). These authors analysed the experience of ACEA, an 
Italian public multi-utility company that introduced a vendor rating mechanism with more than 
100 parameters linked to the quality and past performance of suppliers. The results in terms of 
performance quality have been measured by parameters such as the number of blackouts (with 
a benefit of 6.6 million Euros) or the number of fatal accidents during works. They have been 
very positive, with a percentage of compliance with the parameters ranging from 25% to about 
90% (see Figure 2). Additionally, the same authors noted how the bidders adopted the necessary 
improvements in proportion to the weight of the various parameters on the overall evaluation. 
This made it possible to further highlight the strong incentive offered by these measures. 
The study exploits a policy discontinuity: the use of past reputation in the actual supplier 
evaluation procedure was stopped, even if the evaluation parameters have been maintained to 
monitor the supplier’s performance.27 This allowed the comparison of the results before and 
after the termination of the policy. The results remained quite stable: quality and efficiency of 
public procurement have not decreased. This suggests that the introduction of reputational 
 
27 The study lasted more than 10 years but the actual use of the mechanism by the company lasted just over a year. 
This is because the management changed while the test was in progress and the company's legal offices were 
concerned about the legality of this instrument. The Italian legal system in 2011 had returned to a hybrid system 
(no longer scoring rules, which it had introduced only a year earlier) and allows the evaluation of offers (but no 
more of the bidders) in the selection and award phase (Decarolis, Spagnolo, and Pacini, 2016). 
Figure 2. The Compliance with the Qualification Parameters over Time 
Source: Decarolis, F., Pacini, R., and Spagnolo, G., (2016). 
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parameters has led to many investments for permanent improvements, which have persisted 
after the policy has been terminated. In other words, once the bidders have invested in 
improving their quality standards to comply with the parameters, it was convenient for them to 
maintain these improvements in order to recover the costs incurred over time.  
The costs of these mechanisms are not to be underestimated. The introduction of a similar 
system in a public administration entails also the expenses incurred to create, prepare and 
manage the set of information and procedures necessary for the proper functioning of the 
evaluation process. For example, the PBs would have the burden of recording and inserting the 
evaluations of all the firms interacting with them; the responsibility of effectively managing 
such a large archive is not trivial (Doni, 2006). Other sources of costs include the estimation of 
the parameters to be used, their relative weight on the overall assessment and the methods of 
managing new entrants.28 Additionally, these tools require specific technical skills to be 
acquired by the procurement office’s personnel, and the obligation to manage such information 
with transparency and clarity. This latter need is a clear example of another risk linked to the 
use of past evaluations. It would imply a greater discretion left to who manages the assessments 
and the awarding of the contracts. However, not being able to properly control the actions and 
responsibilities of individual employee cannot be, alone, a valid reason not to use a reputational 
system; this is particularly relevant for contracts of a large value. 
The first chapter has discussed how much discretion should be left to PBs. On the one hand, 
leaving greater discretion to the public contracting authority can lead to a distortion of the 
ordinary procurement processes. Additional discretion may involve both economic costs for the 
control and the prevention of opportunistic behaviour and learning costs for the reorganization 
of the processes. On the other hand, discretion, if thought and applied in the right way in the 
qualification stages, can make the whole procedure more reliable and efficient. Discretion 
would also increase the quality of the execution stage. The application of a reputational system 
is a useful way to include a subjective-discretionary variable in the evaluation process. It would 
certainly favour a less rigid and bureaucratic approach, making more fluid and flexible the 
procurement processes.29 A reputational rating system would create a sort of company pedigree 
that can be used to select the most efficient supplier. Additionally, this system would not 
 
28 There are some debates about the ratings of new entrants or those of bidders not having enough past evaluated 
performances. For instance, for Decarolis, Spagnolo, and Pacini (2016) the most appropriate system is to give 
those who do not have a reputational index an average value compared to those already in possession. It may allow 
them to start from an average position. Otherwise, obtaining a contract and building a reputational background 
from scratch would be very difficult. 
29 As observed above, the efficiency of the processes has been heavily affected by the presence of normative and 
procedural constraints. Although they are still necessary, higher flexibility may help to reduce and overcome 
potential allocative inefficiencies. 
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prevent the PB to jointly evaluate the technical, financial and legal characteristics of the 
suppliers together with their past behaviours, quality and performance. It would offer a dynamic 
analysis of the suppliers. It is not easy to create this system from scratch: there are external 
(related to the legal, political and social implications) and internal problems (as underlined there 
are still debates on costs and benefits) to be considered. But, it may be advantageous for the 
stakeholders and for the public welfare to overcome these problems. The introduction of such 
mechanisms may be useful to test how track record systems on past performance can improve 
the quality, efficiency and reliability of the public procurement processes. A reputational 
screening shows how the choice to leave more or less discretional power may entail risks and 
benefits. Starting from these considerations, in the following chapters the main advantages and 
disadvantages of granting greater discretion to contracting authorities will be studied in the 
selection and in the awarding stage.  
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2.1 Effects of Discretion on Public Procurement Process 
 
The decision about the most suitable awarding procedure is one of the key elements of the 
public procurement process. This choice indirectly determines the degree of freedom that the 
public buyer (PB) can exploit. In turn, more or less discretion for the PB means having certain 
advantages and bearing certain costs. This chapter aims to describe the main literature on the 
potential effects of greater or lower discretion for PBs.  
We will discuss how discretion impacts the dynamics of the procurement process and its final 
performance: on the one hand, greater restrictions and stricter procedures reduce potential 
misuses and abuses by the PBs; on the other hand, they often involve excessive burdens for the 
PBs. These burdens are costs: the pure cost of such rigidity - regulatory systems and constant 
monitoring of the work of bureaucrats - and the opportunity costs in the form of efficiency 
losses that a greater freedom could have avoided. 
The incidence of discretion will not be homogeneous across all public procurement. Indeed, 
there is not a unique solution: every procurement tender requires weighing and balancing the 
advantages offered by a different degree of discretion. In turn, discretion is linked to other 
relevant variables that have to be considered: they make the evaluation of the impact of 
discretion on the processes’ performance even more complex.  
In what follows, we will first focus on the effects of discretion on public procurement process; 
second, we will discuss the role of competence, one of the most relevant factors which interacts 
directly with discretion. Finally, we will present one of the major obstacles to the application 
of discretion, that is the risk of corruption. We use these analyses to try to understand the overall 





2.1.1 Price, Productivity and Ex-Post Renegotiations 
Many works on the relationship between discretionary power and public procurement 
performance exploit thresholds on the base price of a contract. When the contract value exceeds 
the threshold, the public buyer’s discretion in choosing the awarding procedure is limited. 
Specific thresholds have been introduced by almost all the legal systems, both at the national 
and at the international level (in particular for EU countries, see Section 1.2).30 Thresholds are 
very useful to interpret the attitudes of the various legislations towards the use of more or less 
discretionary procedures.  
Generally, the higher the contract’s value, the more procurement regulations mandate the use 
of auction procedures31 and limit the use of other procedures. This may seem counterintuitive: 
more complex projects usually require more complex solutions and the need to leave a greater 
freedom of negotiation to the contracting authority. Limiting the use of discretionary procedures 
aims to reduce opportunistic/corruptive behaviours, both by the PBs and the bidders’ sides. 
Indeed, higher-value projects are more attractive than smaller-value ones, given the increased 
size of the project. As a result, benefits of discretion can be cancelled out (Bajari and Tadelis, 
2001; Decarolis, et al., 2020). The presence of the thresholds in real world procurement, and 
especially their change over time, has been exploited to study whether and how the degree of 
discretion affects the risk of corruption, the quality of the products/services, or the productivity 
of the winning bidders. 
Focusing on the winning bids, various studies investigated whether the use of more 
discretionary procedures could have negative effects on winning rebates and final prices. 
Exploiting changes of the thresholds in Hungary, Szocs (2020) found an average 9% higher 
normalized price32 for contracts below the new threshold – where discretionary procedures are 
allowed - compared to those above – where they are not. The same results, albeit with different 
magnitudes, also emerged from other authors. Decarolis et al. (2020) highlighted the differences 
in the winning rebates between more or less discretionary procedures. Higher discretion 
decreases the average discounts, with a difference in percentage terms compared to open 
 
30 The amount of the thresholds have been described in the previous chapter, taking the Italian legal system as an 
example. 
31 Some exceptions may derogate from these constraints. For “particularly complex” contracts or for technical-
legal difficulties, the use of negotiated procedures or competitive dialogue is allowed (even if their value would 
exceed the thresholds) (Clarich, 2017). 
32 The normalized price is given by the ratio between the winning bid and the original value of the contract. 
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auctions of 2.4%.33 Instead, discretion does not significantly affect the final price. This is 
because the final price includes other source of costs such as renegotiation costs, cost overruns, 
bureaucratic, and management costs. As a result, there are no relevant differences in the results 
of the overall procurement process depending on the procedure used (Decarolis, et al., 2020). 
This discrepancy between the dynamics of winning discounts and the final price causes 
difficulties in the interpretation of the phenomenon. Any higher discounts over the reserve price 
could be interpreted both positively and negatively by the PB: on the one hand, it means a lower 
contractual price; on the other hand, it could mean higher ex-post costs to renegotiate and 
compensate for the excessively low price of the first offer (Baltrunaite et al., 2020).  
Other studies have highlighted how the eventual increase in the winning discount may be 
statistically insignificant, raising concerns about a direct positive link between discretion and 
costs (Coviello, Guglielmo, and Spagnolo, 2018). Observing the public procurement 
behaviours of other European countries, the same dynamics arise. In France, Chever and Moore 
(2012) stressed that, although the relationship between more discretionary procedures and 
winning rebates is negative, no definitive conclusions can be drawn. Factors that indirectly 
affect the price-discretion relationship need not to be underestimated. Among others, the need 
for transparency and the greater responsibility of bureaucrats can affect the application of 
discretion. Ex-ante controls on the PB's integrity and competence may act as a filter to prevent 
potential abuse of discretion (Chever and Moore, 2012). 
Various works study how a change in these thresholds can affect the overall public procurement 
process. The 2011 reform in Hungary previously discussed highlights the different behaviours 
of the contracting authority and of the bidders according to the thresholds’ rise. Here, this 
change leads to a decrease in the productivity of the winning firm compared to the previous 
situation. The extent of this impact has been measured as an average decline in productivity of 
12%. This suggests that the concession for broader use of discretion may lead to a decrease in 
the average productivity of the winning bidder. According to these results, the increase in 
discretionary power acts as a double-edged sword to the procurement process: on the one hand, 
it induces a decrease in the productivity of the selected bidders; on the other hand, the PB may 
cut the value of the contract to fall within the thresholds, saving on the price paid. However, 
this mechanism works because of the misuse of the PB’s power. Although the second effect 
may seem an advantage in terms of public spending, the downward modification of the contract 
 
33 This percentage should be understood as the difference on an average discount (for all procedures) of 18%. 
Furthermore, other interesting evidence emerged on the type of public procurement procedures. When a procedure 
that provides for discretionary criteria is used, we will obtain lower winning rebates; while the procedures 
associated with a smaller number of bidders are characterized by lower winning rebates than open auctions, but to 
a lesser extent than the first (Decarolis, et al., 2020). 
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value to take advantage of greater discretion can lead to designing a contract that does not meet 
the required needs at a technical and executive level. 
Furthermore, these thresholds act as a watershed for contracts around it: the data reveal a wide 
difference between the winning firms for contracts just above and just below the threshold. The 
above-threshold ones are 32% more productive than the below-threshold ones (Szocs, 2020).34 
This impact can clearly be seen in the average productivity of the Italian procurement system: 
as a result of the rise in the thresholds value, the productivity of winning firms decreased by 
10%, while it remained essentially the same for losing bidders. This might suggest that the 
selected bidders are less productive than before, on average (Baltrunaite et al., 2020). This 
difference may be explained by inefficiency or by opportunistic behaviour. Differently, other 
studies do not highlight any negative relationship between the use of discretionary procedures 
and the productivity of the winning bidders. Finally, some other results show how more 
productive and efficient suppliers would be more likely to be selected for future works 
(Coviello, Guglielmo, and Spagnolo, 2018). 
Another relevant measure to evaluate the effect of discretion on public procurement 
performance is the number of renegotiations. Ex-post renegotiations of the initial contract 
become necessary when unanticipated problems or new elements emerge. As discussed in the 
first chapter, this happens more frequently when an auction mechanism is used. In these 
situations, there is no dialogue between bidders and PB. Generally, the higher the complexity 
of the contract, the more it is difficult to state in a binding contractual agreement all the 
specifications necessary for the project, without a negotiation stage. Frequently, auction 
mechanisms lead to the emergence of disputes and litigations that force the parties to re-
negotiate, increasing transaction costs and lengthening the execution times of the works 
(Gagnepain, Ivaldi, and Martimort, 2013). Differently, increasing the discretion in the selection 
process makes easier to find ex-ante an agreement, limiting renegotiations once the contract is 
signed. Indeed, the problem of ex-post renegotiation costs is a direct consequence of the 
incompleteness of the contracts. If the contract cannot be completely set up in detail, giving the 
public buyer more freedom can help fill gaps in evaluating non-contractible parts. This function 
can help to reduce the number and cost of renegotiations of contracts, given the information 
asymmetry in the selection stage (Bajari and Tadelis, 2008; Calzolari and Spagnolo, 2009; 
Coviello, Guglielmo, and Spagnolo, 2018).  
 
34 In addition to the productivity data, The author states that differences have also emerged in other aspects. 
Contracts just below the threshold are more likely to be awarded to companies on average smaller in size (it often 
means less productive). Additionally, the probability of selecting local and/or national firms increases. It certainly 
limits free competition, harming the development of local bidders (Szocs, 2020). 
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The benefit of the reduction of time and costs does not apply only at the negotiation stage. More 
discretionary procedures like negotiations can also help to reduce the time needed to prepare 
and award the tender. Additionally, even the times required for the drawing up and the 
publication of the tender notice are shorter. This advantage emerges in particular because of the 
possibility of preparing less detailed calls for tenders, as the parties will discuss the contents in 
depth during the actual negotiation.  
 
 
2.1.2 Discretion and Competition 
Usually, reduced competitiveness may be interpreted as a pitfall in public awarding procedures. 
However, a lower number of bidders offer the possibility of a more focused, shortened and less 
expensive process (Decarolis, 2014; Decarolis, et al., 2020), in particular where the PB has a 
large discretion. The degree of discretion may affect the level of competition, both directly and 
indirectly. Various studies have investigated whether there is a correlation between the degree 
of discretion PBs enjoy and the number of candidates and bidders.35 We discussed in section 
1.3 how the introduction of more subjective criteria may limit the number of candidates. 
Mechanisms that give greater weight to the past performance of bidders are a fitting example. 
Less-efficient bidders will be more likely to self-exclude themselves from the tender, to avoid 
the costs of preparing the offer.  
Although decreased competitiveness has often been associated with an undesirable result for 
the PB in terms of price paid (Bulow and Kemplerer, 1996), it might also have positive 
implications. Reducing the number of participants decreases the resources used for bidding 
evaluation, saving costs for bid screening. By having the opportunity to assess the offers more 
accurately, the PB should also pay greater attention to non-contractible parts. As a result, costs 
are lowered and adverse selection issues - very frequent in public purchasing processes - are 
mitigated (Butler et al., 2012; Decarolis, et al., 2020).  
We will now discuss how the number of bidders varies with procedures giving more or less 
discretion to the PB. The number of bidders – that is, firms that have submitted a valid offer 
consistent with the tender requirements - does not change substantially from open procedures 
to restricted ones with a negotiation phase (see Sections 1.2.4 and 1.3). What varies significantly 
is the number of initial candidates who apply for the tender. On French procurement data, 
Chever and Moore, 2012 have observed whether a different awarding procedure leads to 
 
35 Candidates refer to these firms that are willing to access to the tender and submit a candidature to qualify. 
Bidders refer to the candidates that overcome the qualification stage and access the tender and they can submit an 
offer. This difference is particularly relevant in restricted procedures.  
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modifications in the number of participants. The focus was on the ratio between the number of 
bidders and the number of candidates and on how this change among the procedures. This ratio 
goes from 0.76 for auction procedures to 0.33 for negotiated ones.36 In other words, about three 
bidders out of four overcome the initial screening in the first case. Differently, only one-third 
of the candidates have the requisites to access the real tender in the negotiated procedures (the 
second case). Negotiated procedures make more difficult for participants to access the next 
phase, because of the constraints at the discretion of the PB (or provided by law). Moreover, 
the study shows that preparing a candidature is relatively not so demanding, but preparing an 
offer represents a huge cost for private contractors (Chever and Moore, 2012). 
These results highlight that the more discretionary a procedure is, the more likely only the best 
bidders will be able to satisfy the access requirements to the tender. The complexity of the 
preparation and discussion of the offer requires a relevant effort. So, other candidates will prefer 
to abandon it, decreasing the number of bidders. This may be advantageous for the PB, as it 
will have to select from a smaller pool of bidders. It would allow to accurately evaluate them, 
treating and discussing the elements of the offer in more detail. Additionally, more discretion 
on the selection criteria allows evaluating the parts that would have left out in a price-based 
auction (Decarolis, et al., 2020).  
The same conclusions can be drawn by looking at the Italian public procurement market in the 
2009-2013 period. Also in this case, there is evidence of a negative relationship between the 
number of bidders and the increase in discretionary powers of the PB. Here, if the central 
purpose is to enhance the number of participating firms, an auction mechanism should be 
preferred. By observing the behaviour above and below the threshold,37 Baltrunaite et al. (2020) 
find that the participants in a negotiated procedure (8, on average) are 4,5 less than in 
competitive tendering (12,5).38  
The correlation between discretion and the number of bidders is particularly relevant when 
considering the effect of the latter on the winning rebate, in particular when the price paid 
represents a decisive parameter for an efficient allocation (Bajari and Tadelis, 2008). Usually, 
 
36 The value of the ratio for non-formalized auction procedures is 0.88. It represents the highest value among the 
options, which means less restrictions to entry and a higher number of bidders who enter the tender (Chever and 
Moore, 2012).  
37 Before 2011, the use of negotiated procedures was restricted for public works with a base price above 500,000 
euros; the reform raised this threshold from 500,000 euros to 1,000,000 euros (Baltrunaite, et al., 2020). 
38 The data should also be interpreted considering the minimum number of participants each legal system requires. 
As we saw in the first chapter, in Italy the negotiated procedures provide for the participation of at least five 
bidders, while the auction procedures require a minimum threshold of 10, according to the value of the contracts 
examined. Baltrunaite et al. (2020) pointed out that in the post-reform period, the average number of participants 




greater competitiveness may contribute to a decrease in the price paid by the public 
administration.  
On data from the Italian Authority for the Surveillance of Public Procurement (AVCP) for all 
the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005 in 100,000 euros (2005 
equivalents), Coviello, Guglielmo, and Spagnolo (2018) found that as participation in the tender 
increases, the price paid by the contracting authority decreases.39 Figure 3 shows, on the 
horizontal axis, the number of bidders and on the vertical one the percentage of rebate from the 
starting value. The three symbols indicate the percentage of the minimum (circle), the 
maximum (rhombus) and the winning rebate (triangle). 40 
The negative correlation between the two variables in the figure is often used as one of the main 
critiques towards discretionary mechanisms. However, the limitations on the use of these 
procedures are stronger for high-value contracts, where more discretion of the bureaucrats could 
be useful. In contrast, there are fewer limitations on the use of discretionary procedures for 
below-threshold contracts, where a price-based tender may be more appropriate, because of the 




39 It refers to the price at which the contract is awarded, inversely proportional to the winning rebate. Both of them 
have not to be confused with the final price of the contract. The latter includes other sources of costs (such as 
renegotiation costs or bureaucracy costs). 
40 The same dataset is used in Coviello and Mariniello (2014) to study the effects of an exogenous increase in 
publicity (i.e., potential competition): these latter authors found that the higher number of potential participants is 
indeed associated with larger discounts. 
Figure 3. The Relationship between the Number of Bidders and the Rebates 
Source: Coviello, D., Guglielmo, A., and Spagnolo, C., (2018). 
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2.1.3 Incumbency and Collusion   
In this section, we discuss the relationship between the discretion of PBs and the incumbent 
bidders. Various studies have argued that as discretion increases, the probability of repeatedly 
awarding contracts to the same bidder also increases. There are two possible interpretations of 
this effect: on the one hand, it might indicate the presence of opaqueness in the relationship 
between the PB and the private contractor; on the other hand, it might signal the creation of a 
long-term relationship, which will improve and streamline performance. The first interpretation 
is suggested by Baltrunaite, et al. (2020) who stated that this effect may lead to efficiency losses 
as regards the winning bidder. Indeed, they found that this bidder has a higher probability of 
being politically connected to the PB.41 Differently, the second interpretation, that is a positive 
relationship in the form of a relational contract is supported by Coviello, Guglielmo, and 
Spagnolo (2018). They have analysed how the quality of the works offered by the incumbents 
has changed over time. The data show that this performance quality does not deteriorate, but 
rather  incumbents improve overt time aspects such as the delay in the delivery of works. 
Specifically, the authors demonstrate that there is a negative relationship between delays in past 
work and the probability of obtaining future ones for contracts below the threshold,42 while this 
finding does not hold for those contracts above the threshold. This suggests that when more 
discretion is granted, i.e. below-threshold, the PB tends to prefer bidders who performed best 
in previous jobs (Coviello, Guglielmo, and Spagnolo, 2018). 
Moving the focus from the seller-buyer relationship to the relations among the bidders, we 
analyse how awarding procedures affect the risk of collusion. Collusion requires that some 
bidders agree among themselves to win the contract on more favourable conditions than the 
ones under normal competition. Auctions based solely on price - for example, FPAs or Vickrey 
auctions - create fertile ground for this type of practice (see Section 1.2.1). The mechanism that 
leaves more room for collusive agreements is the ABAs one, since it provides for an almost 
randomized selection of the winning bid based on price, making it easier for bidders to 
manipulate it (Decarolis, Giorgiantonio and Giovanniello, 2011; Tadelis, 2012). Using price-
based auctions, the risk of an agreement between bidders increases as it becomes easier to 
control the tender if the price is the only selection criterion. Differently, the risk of collusive 
agreements between bidders drastically decreases in more discretionary procedures. These 
 
41 They point out that this is more likely when it deals with local bidders, usually with less efficient governance 
and management (Baltrunaite, et al., 2020). 
42 Art. 24 of Law 109/94 (“Legge Merloni”) introduced the 300,000 euros (converted from Italian liras by the 
authors) threshold giving objective necessary conditions to run restricted auctions. The data refer to the period 
2000-2005, before the change in the threshold due to the EU directives (Coviello, Guglielmo, and Spagnolo, 2018). 
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procedures make more difficult to find an agreement between bidders to alter the result as 
commission ratings become less objective and controllable than price.  
As a result, in the negotiated procedures this problem is really rare, even though there is a lower 
number of bidders than in other procedures. This may contribute to lower the price of the offers: 
as bidders would no longer cooperate to obtain a higher price, they would be forced to compete 
regularly (Chever and Moore, 2012).  
On the other hand, auction procedures are preferred by various legal systems due to the greater 
transparency they can ensure. Lack of transparency is often seen as a major weakness of more 
discretionary procedures. Incorrect use of discretion may allow the PB to circumvent fairness 
and transparency constraints. Sometimes, this may happen for positive purposes, such as 
efficiency improvements, fluidity, and streamlining of the process. Otherwise, an abuse of 
discretional power may occur for the personal advantages of public officials, through corruption 
or favouritism.43 With the 2011 reform of the thresholds in Italy,44 it was observed that the 
amount of information not released by the PB has increased.45 This may suggest misuses of 
discretion by PBs. Their non-compliance with principles of transparency is one of them. It may 
represent a serious threat to the effectiveness of the discretion on the performances and to the 
reputation of the PB itself (Baltrunaite et al., 2020). 
In this section, central to our work, we have observed how  discretion can affect the public 
procurement process. Recalling other works, we have highlighted how the choice to use a more 
or less discretionary procedure can modify the costs that the PB must bear to manage the 
process. We showed that the impact of discretion offers ambiguous and complex answers. The 
real problem is not the direct negative relationship between discretion and public procurement 
performance: the choice to leave more freedom to the PB should also consider other elements 
that can interfere with the final result. We will look at one of these, namely the level of 
competence of the public administration. Its relevance highlights an important issue that could 
mislead the interpretation of data and results. This will offer us a clear example of how often 
the inefficiencies of the PB are not to be directly associated with the discretion. It is also crucial 
to consider to whom and how discretion has been given. 
 
43 Bandiera, Prat, and Valletti (2009), exploiting a dataset on individual purchases of 21 generic goods by 208 
Italian public bodies between 2000 and 2005, found that most of the waste of public administration (83%) results 
from inefficiencies. Only the remaining part (so-called “active waste”) is due to episodes of corruption and 
favouritism. 
44 Until 2011, the use of negotiated procedures was restricted for public works with a value above €500,000. The 
reform raised this threshold from this amount to €1 million, increasing the scope of discretion of procuring agencies 
(Baltrunaite, et al., 2020). 
45 The overall effect was a decrease of 4.2% compared to the average of the available information and compliance 
with the principles of transparency of the contracting authority. Differently, it was difficult to determine the 






2.2 The Role of Competence in Public Procurement 
 
In the previous section, we have highlighted the main effects greater discretional power may 
have on public procurement processes. These effects cannot be univocally interpreted. This is 
due to the different characteristics of each PB: although the adopted measure is the same, 
different procurement tenders may lead to different results. The impact of the discretion offered 
to the PB hides a multitude of aspects that should be weighed and considered.  
Procurement regulation should consider whether to leave the PB with greater or smaller 
decision-making freedom: it has to decide how to design the processes with controls and rules 
and how to check and punish any abuses of the public buyer.  
Choices on more or less freedom do not provide a universally valid answer. Every decision may 
have benefits in a specific context, while it may cause harmful effects if applied in inappropriate 
situations. In this section, we will observe how the literature addresses the competence of the 
PB, one of the key elements linked to the use of discretional power.  
The public apparatus is often mistakenly considered as a single and homogeneous entity, 
without underlining how public administration bodies differ internally. Various organizations 
are responsible for carrying out specific and different tasks; they have different needs and 
requirements, and they cannot be treated as an undifferentiated system. Furthermore, the public 
administration is a group of individuals with different strengths, weaknesses, skills, and 
competencies. Their combinations help to outline the quality and reliability of the various 
offices and bodies.  
 
 
2.2.1 Heterogeneity of the Public Administrations 
The different tasks, outcomes and results of public administrations depend on who manages 
and conducts the process (considering it as an entity; like procurement office, or as an individual 
responsible for bargaining and purchasing).  
Each entity and/or organization differs according to many factors: the operative area and sector 
(education, health, infrastructure,…), the size and institutional type of the entity46 (from the 
 
46 Bandiera, Prat, and Valletti (2009), investigating an Italian dataset for procurement purchases of generic goods 
made by a sample of Italian PBs between 2000 and 2005, observed that on average a local administration pays 
13% more than semi-autonomous entities, such as universities and healthcare companies. The percentage rises to 
21% if the semi-autonomous entities are compared to regional ones and up to 40% to central ones. 
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local authorities to the central ones), the relative degree of delegation and decentralization, 
which can vary from country to country.47  
In OECD countries, public procurement expenditure by local administrations or decentralized 
bodies is 63% of the total.48 But  there can be relevant differences across countries and also 
within the same country. Table 3, from 
Chiappinelli (2019), refers to public 
works contracts awarded in Italy 
between 2008 and 2015; data are 
obtained from TED (Tenders Electronic 
Daily) data.49 These data highlight the 
difference in the percentage of winning 
rebates according to the central 
administration type. The table underlines 
how, on average, central entities are 
more likely to obtain a higher winning 
rebate (i.e. a lower price paid). 
In this multiplicity of variables and characteristics of the individual entities, the competence of 
the PB is particularly relevant. It is often one of the most underrated aspects, but one of the 
most decisive in determining public administration efficiency. The PB should be able to assess 
the impact of its decisions concerning both the administration itself and the extra-economic 
consequences it could have on the community. It is influenced by how the public administration 
manages all stages of the procurement process and all the necessary skills (legal, technical, 
financial, strategic, and marketing). The lack of competencies represents one of the main 
problems relating to the public procurement world, contributing to enhance the fear for more 
 
47 In Italy, the procurement rules recognize the division between various entities (central, local, and semi-
autonomous). It is possible to notice a trend towards the centralization of purchases already from the 90s onwards 
(given a general downsizing of public spending), which led to the establishment of Consip. Initially, it was a body 
created for the management of IT purchases, then it became one of the most important central purchasing bodies 
at the national level among the European ones. It carries out tasks such as the threshold prices to which the various 
administrations must comply and to which they can turn for the purchase and management of public contracts. In 
Russia, the purchasing and management system of public contracts (representing 10% of GDP) is highly 
decentralized. It is almost entirely managed by the single governmental entities that have full legal authority. 
Instead, the law system is under the responsibility of the central government (Best, Hjort, and Szakonyi, 2017). 
On the other hand, in South Korea the centralized system for public procurement (PPS) manages an important part 
of them (almost 33% in 2013), exploiting the advantages both in economic and social terms of this choice (Saussier 
and Tirole, 2015). 
48 OECD, 2017. In Chiappinelli, O., 2019. Decentralization and public procurement performance. Economic 
Inpuiry, 58(2), 856-88. 
49 Regarding the size and area of competence of the various administrations, one of the possible mitigating 
circumstances to explain these differences is that local authorities may not have the financial resources to face 
these problems. 
Table 3. Winning Rebates by CA Type 
Source: Chiappinelli, O., (2019). 
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discretionary procedure (where the competence is even more a crucial factor). In France, only 
39% of the PBs’ personnel have the requirements for public procurement activity, 63% do not 
have juridical-legal backgrounds, and 61% of them have their first experience in procurement 
in a public administration50 (Saussier and Tirole, 2015). The same trend can be easily observed 
in many other countries.51  
The PB’s role has strong relevance in the procurement process: in the awarding stage and in the 
selection of the best awarding procedure, he/she should identify the best contractor with whom 
to sign the contract, following what the regulations allow. However, the effectiveness of the 
PB’s power is strictly linked to its competencies. Indeed, the bargaining ability and the ability 
to select the most efficient supplier is not to be considered an exogenous variable. It represents 
one of the key factors that may affect the achievement of the desired result, aimed at obtaining 
the greatest gain in terms of costs and efficiency. 
The inefficient management of the public procurement process represents one of the main 
causes of waste of public resources, i.e. what Bandiera, Prat and Valletti (2009) called “passive 
waste”. Unlike the active one - the public buyer voluntarily alters the correct execution of the 
procedures to obtain personal advantages as in the case of corruption -, the passive waste entails 
only disadvantages, both for the PB and the other agents (firms, consumers, etc.). In their 
empirical investigation in Italian procurement for generic goods made by a sample of Italian 
PBs between 2000 and 2005, Bandiera, Prat and Valletti (2009) shows that passive waste 
accounted for 83% of total waste. These inefficiencies arise mainly due to excessive 
bureaucracy or extremely stringent regulations. Besides, the lack of competencies makes the 
purchasing process even less efficient. Additionally, the mechanisms (such as linking the 
remuneration of PB to the performances or further sanctions) to contrast and correct the 
negative consequences of these inefficiencies are often difficult to implement,52 enhancing the 




50 See: UGAP (Union des Groupements d'Achats Publics), quoted in: (2-2)Saussier, S., Tirole, J., 2015. 
Strengthening the efficiency of public procurement. Notes du conseil d’analyse économique. 22 (3), 1-12. 
51 See Benchmarking Public Procurement 2017, World Bank. 
52 Bandiera, Pratt and Valletti (2009) state that it is very complicated to link remuneration with the performances 
of the public buyer and to give him more responsibilities for the potential damages. This because of, 
respectively, the onerousness of these mechanisms and the difference in terms of economic wealth between the 
institution and single public agent. Other studies have shown how offering greater remuneration incentives to 
low-skilled offices does not adequately help improve the efficiency of the procurement process and does not 
improve performance (Chiappinelli, 2019).  
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2.2.2 The Public Buyer’s Ability 
Bucciol, Cambioni, and Valbonesi (2020) studied the PB’s competence in the procurement of 
standard medical devices in Italy using data referring to the period January-December 2013. 
They observed how a higher level of PB’s competence and skills impact the overall process 
performance. The authors exploited the termination of the so-called reference prices,53 a policy 
that reduced the discretion of PBs. This policy has led to an opposite effect in entities with 
different levels of competence. On average, it appears that reference prices had an overall 
modest effect. However, when considering PBs with different competence, the authors found 
that, on the one hand, the application of reference prices had benefits for the less competent 
offices (with a decrease in the average price paid by 18.12%), on the other hand, it led to an 
increase in the prices paid by highly competent public buyers (+ 8.48%). This casts doubt on 
the effectiveness of general policies applied in a non-discriminatory way. It would be preferable 
to reduce discretion only for the worst bureaucrats (Bucciol, Cambioni, and Valbonesi, 2020).54 
Additionally, their results show a positive correlation between the size of the institution (one of 
the factors listed above) and the advantage in terms of competencies. They used the costs for 
hospital personnel (healthcare and non-healthcare) as a parameter for the size of the hospital. 
Their results are explained by the higher costs related to non-healthcare personnel (i.e. larger 
administrative staff) and highlighted how delegating purchasing activities to a larger body can 
bring greater benefits. A large PB may exploit the increase in terms of skills, competencies, and 
bargaining power that a small PB cannot obtain. The same authors observed how local PBs (i.e. 
local health authorities) spend more for the same products than large hospitals. 
About the healthcare sector, Grennan (2014) studied the purchasing process of a particular 
product (coronary stents) in different US public hospitals. He noted how the purchasing staff 
(and the overall company) knowledge and skills explain most of the price differentials paid by 
the buyer. The difference in bargaining ability accounts for 79% of this variability. It affects 
the prices incurred by the hospitals and it is not less relevant in determining the price, than other 
elements such as the presence of competitors, suppliers’ costs, or the public company's 
 
53 The introduction of reference prices imposes a cap on the unit price of each standard medical device procured 
by tender. The aim of this policy was to limit PB discretion in an attempt to reduce public procurement expenditure. 
Reference prices for these product categories were applied from 2012 to 2013. It allows to analyse how the PB’s 
behaviour changes in this period and how reference prices affect the overall performances. 
54 The study was conducted by observing public administrations before and after the introduction of reference 
prices. They were introduced in Italy in 2012 and then abolished the following year with a sentence of the 
Administrative Court. These measures have offered a positive result as regards the reduction of price dispersion. 
Differently, they have not proved to be so effective in making the supply system more efficient as a whole, with a 
non-linear effect on the level of bureaucrats competence (Bucciol, Cambioni, and Valbonesi, 2020). This 
underlined the need for measures that enhance competence level in procurement procedures. 
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willingness to pay.55 On the other hand, bargaining ability is a skill that concerns both the single 
manager and the hospital as a whole. It can be often influenced by external factors, linked to 
the context and the organization itself. As a result, it is difficult to establish how much its 
improvement benefits the individual operator and how much the organization as a whole. With 
regard to single managers, Janke, Propper and Sadun (2019) studied the incidence of CEOs in 
the English healthcare sector. In this context, the organizational inertia and the constant 
turnover limit their intervention. As a result, the impact of high-level managers on the overall 
performance is quite limited. This enhances the need for learning and improving the skills of 
all the bureaucrats and not just the high-level ones. 
 
 
2.2.3 Competence and Discretion 
Looking at the data, the importance of public sector expertise is often underestimated. This may 
damage the public sector from several points of view: first, on a reputational level, by losing 
credibility due to inefficient choices and procedures; second, regarding the cost-effectiveness 
of the procedures, with waste both in terms of time and in terms of economic resources. In 
particular, reducing such waste would allow greater savings and consequent greater spending 
opportunities. This claim is strongly supported by U.S. data, and statistical evidence on the 
matter is highlighted by the study of Decarolis et al. (2018). They assume a scenario where the 
general proficiency level rises to the 90th percentile of the current distribution. This increase in 
generalized competencies would reduce the execution times of the contract (saving of almost 
40 days, corresponding to 23% less) and the monetary costs. The saving for the United States 
could reach 2.6 billion dollars yearly, more than 120,000 dollars per contract, on average.56  
Additionally, the effects of a greater competence of the public buyer may also reduce the 
number of renegotiations, a symptom of the need to correct previous erroneous agreements. We 
note an improvement in the renegotiation of costs (40% less) and time (71% less) (Decarolis et 
al., 2018). These effects help to further decrease the waste related to the high costs of 
renegotiation, very frequent in the context of public procurement (Gagnepain, Ivaldi, and 
Martimort, 2013).  
 
55 On the other hand, the same author underlines how the blame for a possible poor bargaining capacity is often 
not to be attributed directly to the overall entity. Indeed, in this analysis we have to consider also that each 
entity/body presents differences in terms of size, economic and human resources. It may be due to the scarce 
availability of resources which does not allow the company to be able to invest in the improvement of this aspect, 
leading to opting for a non-optimal solution in order to guarantee resources for other activities.  
56  These effects refer only to the "direct" effect of the improvement in the level of competence. Without 
considering the possible beneficial effects resulting from an optimization of the measures related to public 
procurement, such as the selection of the award procedure and the type of contract used. 
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The positive relationship between the level of PB’s competence and the price paid in the public 
procurement purchases is supported also by Bandiera, Pratt, and Valletti (2009). They argue 
that if the prices paid by the 10th percentile of the price distribution of the products would have 
paid by the whole sample, the overall savings could be between 1.6 and 2.1 billion euros ( with 
a benefit in percentage terms of about 21% of current expenses).  
The relevance of competence in public procurement performance arise also in a more 
decentralized procurement system. The analysis conducted on Russian public procurement 
confirms the trend even in a context where the internal differences and heterogeneity within the 
public administration exacerbate the PBs’ inefficiencies (see note 47). Almost half of the price 
variability for the purchase of the goods and services in the period 2011-2015 are explained by 
the bureaucrats and public procurement processes inefficiency. Their improvement would lead 
to a potential saving in absolute terms of about 13 billion dollars per year. These additional 
costs for ineffective PBs come from two main sources: first, ineffective bureaucrats impose 
useless costs for suppliers to fulfil the contract (such as wasteful product specifications); 
second, they usually require higher participation costs – as an example, through higher deposits 
or bribes to enter the tender -, leading to a lower level of competition and higher prices for the 
same level of quality (Best, Hjort, and Szakonyi, 2017). 
Comparing more and less competent PBs, the same authors underlined that "policies that are 
not optimal when the effectiveness of the public administration is high can become the second-
best when the effectiveness is low"57 (Best, Hjort, and Szakonyi, 2017). This suggests how 
every solution should be tailored to the effectiveness of the public body and adopted considering 
the different institutional and cultural context. Differently, implementing the most efficient 
solution in inefficient contexts does not lead always to the best possible outcome. 
The relationship between competence and discretion may also be interpreted negatively. From 
a study by Baltrunaite et al. (2020), we observe how a higher degree of discretion is often left 
to PBs with a low level of competence. As we have seen in this section, less competent public 
buyers may lead to less efficient procurement choices. As a result, giving more discretion to 
them may cause allocative inefficiencies, not exploiting the positive effects the discretion may 
have.  
The work by Baltrunaite et al. (2020) confirms that the discretion represents a power that should 
be weighted and applied coherently. Discretionary policies should be adapted to the type of 
 
57 Russian bid preference policy saved the government 17.5% of annual procurement expenses when it was 
implemented by the least effective quartile of procurers, but only 0.7% when it was implemented by the most 
effective quartile of procurers (Best, Hjort and Szakonyi, 2017). 
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environment, competence, and bureaucracy, case by case.58 Measures implemented 
indiscriminately regardless of the level of efficiency and competence of the various public 
buyers are a clear source of waste. 
Unfortunately, the level of competence is not always observable. Most of the studies address 
the argument considering the purchase of standard goods and services, usually characterized by 
simple and uniform procedures. Their procurement process is less complex by nature and the 
accumulated experience can mitigate negative effects. More complex contracts usually require 
greater discretion for the exceptional nature and value they could generate. Thus, the 
importance of professionalization of bureaucrats and the public system as a whole is heightened. 
The link between the level of competence of public buyers and the degree of complexity of the 
contract has to be analysed from several points of view. Intuitively, this relationship should be 
positive, since more complex contracts should require greater skills and discretional power for 
the contracting authority. Unfortunately, this relationship is often misunderstood. This is 
because the most complex contracts are more likely to be assigned to the most efficient and 
competent public authorities. As a result, they have to deal with a greater risk of mistakes, 
delays and renegotiations. Differently, the less competent and/or efficient PBs usually have to 
manage standard procurements. Simpler purchasing processes may reduce delays and costs of 
the project, leading to misleading conclusions about the bureaucrats' competencies (Decarolis 
et al., 2018). 
The relationship between competence and discretion is often overlooked by the public 
administration itself. These are often focused on fighting ex-post the negative effects of lack in 
competence, proposing further stiffening at the regulatory level. A valid alternative may be to 
invest resources to encourage the creation, sharing, and learning of skills (individual and 
organizational ones). As a result, a skilled public workforce would allow greater trust in the 
public administration and a qualitative leap in terms of efficiency and credibility.  
Encouraging the presence of agents with certified competence and efficiency requirements 
would increase performance in the public procurement area. The professionalization of these 
figures and the investment to favour learning and the sharing of skills and cooperation between 
less and more efficient organizations would certainly contribute to softening these rigid 
procedures. A progressive loosening of stringent regulations may favour the positive effects 
that more discretion has on public procurement performance. 
 
 
58 Empirical evidence suggests that in practice there is no universally perfect solution for reaping the benefits of 
competence in the public purchasing process. The savings in procurement due to the introduction of a preference 
criterion for local offers applied by the least effective quartile (-17.5%) is higher than that obtained if the most 





2.3 The Relationship between Discretion and Corruption 
 
In the previous sections, we discussed how the public buyer discretion affects the public 
procurement performances and how this relation is influenced by many other factors. The 
competence of the public administration is one of them. The influence of the level of 
competence on discretion highlights how each solution must be adapted to the context in which 
it is to be adopted. This means that each measure should be implemented considering the 
context and the actors involved.  
 
 
2.3.1 The Corruption in Public Procurement Processes 
The relationship between PB’s discretion and corruption has always been one of the key issues 
in the public procurement approach. Here, corruption means the awarding of a specific contract 
to a bidder, in exchange for something. Such an exchange can involve both economic bribes or 
other kinds of non-monetary payments, which benefit the corrupted bureaucrat. To give a 
complete definition, corruption is “the offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting, directly or 
indirectly, of any thing of value to influence the action of a public official in the procurement 
process or in contract execution'' (World Bank, 2004).59 This issue falls into the macro category 
of public administration inefficiencies, but it should be treated as a separate topic given its 
relevance.  
Corruption has always been considered one of the major problems of the public procurement 
system. It is particularly relevant, as civil servants manage public resources and work for the 
collective well-being, trying to obtain the best possible result on behalf of other people. 
Furthermore, the risk of corruption is stronger in the public rather than in the private sector 
because, in the public sector, who has to pay for a service is not the same as who has to use it. 
This represents a captivating opportunity for those who have to make procurement decisions. 
Differently, in the private sector, the person most interested in choosing the best possible 
supplier - for quality and costs - is the decision-maker himself.  
Corruption is the main reason why open competitive procedures are the preferred awarding 
mechanisms in many procurement regulations. Open auctions make it easier to comply with the 
principles of transparency and open competition, identifying the supplier through objective 
 




selection mechanisms and criteria (Tadelis, 2012). However, competitive auctions are not free 
from the risk of corruption.  
In competitive auctions, the corruptive mechanisms can be summarized in three main categories 
(Dimitri, Piga, and Spagnolo, 2006; Lengwiler and Wolfstetter, 2009): i) bid rigging occurs 
when the auctioneer reveals information about the opponents' offers, allowing the favoured one 
to adapt its bid accordingly; ii) bid orchestration occurs when the auctioneer coordinates the 
various offers, in order to obtain the aimed result; iii) for the selection criteria that include 
subjective parameters rather than just the price, the most common practice is the distortion of 
the quality ranking. In the last case, the corrupting bidder can bribe the rating commission 
members, who would assign a higher score to the former.  
These options show how the possibilities of altering the correct functioning of the tender are 
varied. So, bidders can adapt a corrupt behaviour to the different weaknesses of each procedure. 
Decarolis et al. (2020), in his empirical analysis on over 200,000 procurement auctions in Italy 
during 2000-2016, finds that auctions using discretionary criteria are 6% more likely to be 
assigned to corrupt bidders than first-price auctions. 
The risk of corruption has to be assessed by looking at available information and running 
measurements. These measurements can be divided into four types of approach to the problem. 
a) direct indicators relating to the perception of corruption and quality in institutions; b) indirect 
(subjective) indicators relating to the consideration of institutions by citizens; c) indirect (but 
objective) indicators such as the levels of effectiveness of the expenditure (see e.g. missing 
expenditure); d) the number of recorded crimes involving corruption or similar activities. The 
latter is the most reliable approach. A good indicator should consist of both objective and 
subjective parameters.60 Objective parameters may consider reports of crimes attributable to 
public administrations or the presence of politically-connected firms among the candidates, or 
firms subject to investigation. Instead, subjective parameters may take into account the 
consideration of "end users". They represent a useful way to assess the reliability of public 
administrations. Collecting data on the perception of the public bureaucrats' integrity is an 
example of a subjective parameter (Mocetti and Orlando, 2019). The comparison of subjective 
parameters across countries is difficult, because a similar event can be perceived differently 
depending on specific values. Different mentalities and cultures may lead to more or less 
sensitivity to episodes of favouritism and corruption. This heterogeneity makes it difficult to 
use it as an objective yardstick. 
 
60 These approaches bring with them also important problems: the indirect ones could be influenced by other 
variables that alter a correct interpretation; the direct ones could offer misleading results due to the methods or 





2.3.2 Which Link between Competition and Corruption 
Various studies have investigated the relationship between discretion and competition with 
often ambiguous results. Like any relationship, also the discretion-corruption one is affected by 
other factors, such as the competence of the public administration, the institutional context, or 
the level of competition. The latter is discussed in this section.  
Starting from the checks of the prerequisites to access the phase of submission of offers, various 
studies have highlighted how the limitation of competition leads to an increase in contracts 
awarded to politically connected companies (Auriol, Straub, and Flochel, 2016; Baltrunaite et 
al., 2020).  
The main driver of these results is the restriction on the use of competitive mechanisms, rather 
than a general impact of discretion on the selection procedure. Indeed, the presence of discretion 
in the qualification stage allows to select more easily the favoured bidders. Differently, if we 
consider the discretion applied in the subsequent phase of selection and evaluation of the offers, 
the effect is much lower (Decarolis, et al., 2020). As noted in the previous chapter, solutions 
that offer less restriction on participation lead to a greater number of bidders. The more the 
procedures have stringent entry requirements, the lower the number of participants.  
The restriction on free competition is generally perceived negatively, because the greater the 
number of competitors, the higher the winning rebate and the lower the price paid by the public 
administration. These results are in line with the idea that open procedures increase 
competitiveness in the procurement process (Baltrunaite et al., 2020).  
As a result, the problem should focus on the relationship between the risk of corruption and the 
limitation of competition, rather than discretion itself. Decarolis et al. (2020) study how this 
relationship works. On the one hand, corrupt PBs are more likely to select a discretionary 
auction mechanism (by criteria or by barriers to entry), with a difference of +1.74% with respect 
to non-corrupted ones; on the other hand, the bodies investigated for corruption select 
procedures with a high level of discretion less commonly, with a probability of -1.14% 
compared to not investigated ones. These results suggest that it would be easier for a corrupt 
bureaucrat to favour a contractor among a small audience of bidders. 
However, it should not to be taken for granted that less competition leads to a reduction in the 
risk of corruption mechanisms, in particular when the product/service awarded is not 
homogeneous and it can be offered at different quality levels. Celentani and Ganuza (2002) 
created a model to study the link between corruption and the optimal procurement mechanisms. 
The authors noted that an increased competition has an ambiguous effect on the procurement 
55 
 
market. Differently, if we consider the market for procurement agents, we note a positive 
relationship between competition and corruption:61 if increased competition implies a higher 
ability to verify delivered quality, corruption will unambiguously be higher. In the market for 
PBs, as competition increases, the expected gain from corruption would increase, and 
consequently, corruption itself would increase (Celentani and Ganuza, 2002). 
 
 
2.3.3 The Thresholds in Contract Value and the Risk of Corruption 
The thresholds on contract value – that restricts the use of discretionary mechanisms for 
contracts above that level – can be used to study the risk of corruption. Usually, greater 
discretion is associated with an increase in the presence of corruption mechanisms. The analysis 
relating to the thresholds highlights another possible consequence.  
Indeed, PBs may prefer a more discretionary procedure. A corrupted PBs may deliberately cut 
the base price of the contract, to remain below the threshold and exploit greater freedom in the 
selection of the favoured bidders. This would often lead to sub-optimal solutions not only 
because of the corruption risk, but also due to the misalignment between the real value of the 
project and the risk of issuing lower value tenders. As a result, it would lead to a higher 
probability of renegotiation, and a further loss of efficiency and quality in the execution of the 
project itself. According to Decarolis (2020), the effectiveness of mechanisms that put 
additional constraints on discretion must be weighted with the huge cost resulting from the 
implementation of these (Decarolis, 2020). 
Despite this, various studies investigate the PBs’ behaviour for contracts around the threshold 
values, and the effect of a reduction or restriction of these thresholds. Szocs (2020) exploited 
the 2011 reform in Hungary which raised these thresholds, allowing more discretionary 
procedures. In the passage from the old threshold value to the new one, an important mass of 
contracts awarded just below the threshold has emerged. As suggested earlier, this behaviour 
may be a strategic choice of the PB.  
Furthermore, in the same paper, it emerged that, if at least one of the bidders is politically 
connected to the government, the most discretionary procedures are preferred. These results 
suggest that the political connection affects the increased use of discretional procedures.  
 
61 Considering the case where agents know the quality level offered, which they exploit to lie about it in exchange 
for bribes and benefits. In this scenario, the data support the positive relationship between the number of bidders 
and the gains deriving from corrupt behaviours (Celentani and Ganuza, 2002). 
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Another element that could underline the positive relationship between discretion and 
corruption refers to the change in productivity:62 lower productivity may be a signal of a less 
efficient or corrupted procurement process. Szocs (2020) found that the change in the amount 
of the threshold decreases the average productivity of contractors by approximately 1.6%.   
Baltrunaite et al., (2020) on a dataset of Italian tenders for all public works contracts awarded 
by Italian municipalities in the period 2009-2013, observe that greater discretion is correlated 
to lower productivity; and an increase in the number of politically connected firms. In the same 
investigation, authors found that, on average, winning bids record an increase of 2.16% 
compared to the situation where the thresholds were set lower. 
Additionally, these authors highlight a strong increase in the use of discretionary procedures. 
This trend applies to both below-threshold and above-threshold contracts, where there are 
extensive restrictions on the use of negotiated procedures. Figure 4 represents the distribution 
of contracts awarded through negotiated procedures below and above-threshold (500,000 euros) 
in the period 2009-2013. Negotiated procedures became substantially more frequent starting 
from 2011 (when the reform of the thresholds applied).  
 
 
62 Szocs notes a decrease in the average productivity of 12%. Furthermore, there is an anomalous distribution of 
low productivity offers in highly discretional mechanisms. Starting from these assumptions, he has stated that 
“buyers of contracts in which the winning firm would have been less productive even if the open auction has been 
used more often choose a high degree of discretion” (Szocs, 2020). 
Figure 4. Negotiated Procedures Below and Above-Threshold 




2.3.4 Corruption and  Competence 
The heterogeneity in the perception of corruption can be noticed in the different PBs’ behaviour. 
Greater discretion needs the presence of other values affecting the overall assessment of the 
performance, such as the competence and integrity of the various public bureaucrats 
(Baltrunaite et al., 2020). In this section, we are investigating the general relationship between 
discretion and corruption. But other variables may indirectly affect it. In many cases, the risk 
of corruption in the procurement systems is only a consequence. 
Sometimes, everything arises from the inefficiencies in the bureaucrats' selection. It leads to 
entrust the procurement processes to less efficient and competent bodies and bureaucrats. In 
turn, they will be more likely to accept illegal agreements and to abuse their power.  
A solution could be the implementation of self-regulation mechanisms in order to quickly detect 
any corrupt public officials. Mocetti and Orlando (2019) show how such anti-corruption 
measures work only in public administrations where corruption is already rare. This would lead 
to a widening of the gap between less corrupt and more corrupt offices since in the latter ones 
these mechanisms would not ensure an effective deterrent.  
The same authors investigate the relationship between the public and private sectors. Although 
public employees have higher levels of education than private ones, they noted that this gap 
disappears when corruption levels are higher than average. In these environments, less qualified 
personnel perform tasks usually entrusted to more qualified personnel. As a result, the 
relationship between corruption and the quality of public processes is at least partially explained 
by deficiencies in the skills and behaviour of public bureaucrats. These results reinforce our 
belief that the higher level of corruption is primarily due to lower competence.  
The use of stricter rules to manage relations between the PB and private contractors is a double-
edged sword: on the one hand, it allows to reduce ineffective spending for inefficient or corrupt 
agents; on the other hand, however, the cost associated with bureaucracy and the control of 
these rules increases. Therefore, stricter rules can bring important advantages in fighting 
corruption but they can also lead to a reduction in the level of performance when bureaucrats 
are “honest” and efficient. The negative impact on efficient PBs of a generalized tightening of 
the rules has emerged also in the United States procurement system. Given the high degree of 
alignment between bureaucrats and the public administration (82%), the tightening of the rules 
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led to a decline in the performance quality63 (Carril, 2021). This survey is in line with the 
incidence of active inefficiencies on the total public waste, even in EU countries.64 
We have observed how the incidence of the risk of corruption is highly variable. We have seen 
only the main effects arising from the relationship between discretion and corruption (leaving 
it out other relevant aspects, such as the relationship between corruption and subcontracting65).  
To conclude, we observe that the positive relationship between discretion and corruption is only 
a consequence of PBs’ behaviour and competence. As discretion increases, the competence of 
PBs should increase as well. Choosing stricter procedures can only be considered a short-term 
remedy, an attempt to “bury the dust under the carpet”.  
A policy suggestion is to simultaneously give more responsibilities to PBs and to increase the 
transparency rules they have to comply with (Chever and Moore, 2012). Other effective policies 
may be: the introduction of systems of “professionalization” for PBs, focusing on their training; 
imposing constraints on the procurement agent market, controlling prerequisites relating to the 
competence and transparency of these entities; increasing the responsibilities in the 
procurement process.  
Furthermore, it is worth noting how this evidence concerns the world of public procurement in 
normal conditions. In the next chapter, emergency procurement will be introduced. In these 
situations, urgency and emergency will affect how the processes are carried out. This leads to 






63 Carril (2020) estimates that compliance with compliance costs impacted on an average of $ 12,800 per contract. 
This accounts for 12.8% of the total amount of the awarded contract (considering the threshold of $ 100,000 as a 
minimum amount to use the auction procedure).  
64 For instance, in Italy we note how passive waste accounts for 83% of total waste. Only the remaining part can 
be associated with the active waste, where the public bureaucrat exploits his position to his advantage (Bandiera, 
Pratt and Valletti, 2009). 
65 As in the relationship between discretion and competence, subcontracting also plays an important role with 
regard to corruption. Here it has been deliberately omitted so as not to risk not talking about it exhaustively. 
Regarding the positive correlation between this and the risk of corruption, there is a constant and ongoing debate 
with many prominent authors who have focused on this relationship (Branzoli and Decarolis, 2015; Moretti and 
Valbonesi, 2015; Miller, 2014; Decarolis, 2014). 
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3 EMERGENCY PROCUREMENT AND THE EFFECTS OF 











3.1  The Emergency Procurement  
 
In the previous chapters, we have described the main dynamics of the public procurement 
process under standard conditions. An equally broad branch of public procurement refers to 
situations when these conditions are no longer valid. When this happens, normal procedures 
must leave room for alternatives that allow to face different, extraordinary, needs and 
requirements. Emergency public procurement concerns purchasing in exceptional and/or 
unusual conditions and/or urgent conditions. In these cases, the normal procedures are replaced 
by other ones, with the aim of speeding up and streamlining the entire process. This is necessary 
to quickly deal with unforeseen situations and solutions.  
In the previous chapters, we explored the difficult task of the various jurisdictions in designing 
which options leave available to the contracting authority. On the one hand, the fear of 
opportunistic behaviour by both private agents and public officials requires greater control to 
prevent such risks. This is achieved by tightening the rules governing the public procurement 
process. It means increasing controls and reducing the options available to the contracting 
authority. On the other hand, the need to make public procurement more efficient and flexible 
pushes in the opposite direction: when opportunistic behaviours are not a problem, greater 
discretion can reduce steps and controls in the procurement process, making the bureaucracy 
less pervasive. 
In the “usual” procurement, the PB’s decision on the value of the contract, the type of awarding 
procedure and suppliers’ qualification, etc. could be done accordingly to the regulation setting. 
In emergency procurement, different needs and requirements arise: PBs must give up some of 
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the advantages of the ordinary procedures to respond promptly and effectively to the 
emergency.  
An emergency is intended as an "urgent situation in which there is clear evidence that an event 
or a series of events has occurred which imminently threatens human lives or livelihoods, and 
where the event or a series of events produces disruption in the life of a community on an 
exceptional scale" (Emergency Procurement Procedures, United Nations). 
Taking up the categories of emergency in the United Procurement Manual of the UN,66 such 
situations can arise as a consequence of certain events: sudden calamities (earthquakes, floods, 
...); emergency for human reasons, such as refugee migration; natural causes such as drought, 
or diseases that make certain populations vulnerable; shocks of an economic or political nature; 
other types of emergencies in which the various countries need supra-national interventions to 
support an effective response. Note that this is only one of the possible classification of these 
cases. However, all emergencies have an immediate threat to the health, safety, or even life of 
parts of the world population. From this general categorization, each country has derived 
precise rules to evaluate whether and when emergency procedures are applicable. 
 
 
3.1.1  Regulatory Framework      
Comparing the procurement regulations of different countries is outside the scope of this thesis. 
In this section, we will focus on the Italian procurement regulation and we study how the system 
was designed to adapt the public procurement process in situations of extreme urgency or 
emergency periods.  
As regards the standard public procurement procedures, some derogations are provided for 
certain situations also in ordinary procurement.  
As an example, the negotiated procedures can be divided according to the degree of publicity: 
there is the possibility of proceeding with a negotiated tender even without the prior publication 
of the tender notice.67 This provision applies when, for reasons of extreme urgency arising from 
unforeseeable events by the PB, the terms for the use of other procedures cannot be met. These 
applications must always be properly justified to limit potential abuses.  
As described in the first chapter, the Italian legal system has established thresholds concerning 
the application of the procedures according to the value of contracts. These thresholds have the 
purpose of setting limits on the use of discretionary procedures such as restricted auctions, 
negotiations, or competitive dialogue. Under standard conditions, the European Union has 
 
66 Reference is made to the latest update of the document, on June 30th, 2020. 
67 Art. 63, co.2, lett. c), Codice degli Appalti. 
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recently revised upward these values. The new thresholds have been incorporated into Article 
35 of Codice degli Appalti (the Italian procurement code) and they aim to allow for the PB to 
have more discretion in choosing the procurement mechanisms. Besides, other changes were 
introduced with the aim of streamlining and making the procedure more efficient even under 
standard conditions. The new rules provide that contracts with a value between 40,000 and 
200,000 euros can be awarded using a negotiated procedure with the prior consultation of at 
least three potential suppliers.68 Additionally, one of the most interesting provisions also in 
terms of emergency procurement concerns the award of contracts with a value lower than 
40,000 euros. For these contracts, the Italian law provides for the possibility of using the direct 
awarding procedure69 (without the prior consultation of two or more operators).  
The direct awarding procedure - not mentioned up to now - is a solution granted by the Italian 
procurement code for specific contracts. It offers the PB the possibility of assigning the contract 
without resorting to a competitive and structured process like a tender. Under specific 
conditions, a direct awarding procedure is allowed even in periods of "normality", i.e. under no 
emergency. The requirements for using this procedure are not limited to the maximum threshold 
value (40,000 euros) but the PB must also justify the choice with respect to the principles of 
economy and competition. According to the guidelines of ANAC,70 compliance with these 
constraints is possible through a simple comparison of the cost estimates of at least two different 
economic operators.71 These changes could speed up the entire process under normal 
conditions, at the cost of increasing the risk of opportunistic behaviours. Further modifications 
have also been supported through the so-called “Sblocca Cantieri” decree72 aimed at speeding 
up and streamlining urban regeneration procedures and, in particular, post-earthquakes 
reconstruction.73  
Although these changes refer to the management of ordinary procedures, they underline a recent 
trend of the Italian legal system (and of the EU directives) to respond more quickly and 
effectively to the different needs of the public administration under different conditions. 
 
68 The latest amendment became applicable from January 1st 2020, through the EU regulations no. 1828 and 1829. 
The negotiated procedure is allowed for service and supply contracts managed by central government authorities 
(from € 144,000 to € 139,000), non-central (set at € 214,000) and for works contracts (€ 5,350,000). 
69 This provision is valid also for the awarding of services and supplies with a value between 40,000 and the 
threshold set by the European Union (ordinarily set at 221,000 euros). 
70 ANAC (Associazione Nazionale Anti Corruzione), the Italian Anti-Corruption Authority 
71 Guidelines n.4/2016. ANAC did not limit the possibility of resorting to the direct award procedure but 
emphasized the need for an assessment of the congruity of its use. 
72 The decree Sblocca Cantieri (DL 18/04/2019, n. 32) containing "Urgent provisions for the relaunch of the public 
contracts sector, for the acceleration of infrastructural interventions, urban regeneration and reconstruction 
following sismic events", was converted into law with Law 14/06/2019, n. 55, published in the Gazzetta Ufficiale 
of 17/06/2019, n. 140 and in force from 18/06/2019. 
73 This decree contains provisions related to major earthquakes which hit the country in recent years (Molise, 2019; 
Abruzzo, 2009; Central Italy, 2012 and 2016). 
62 
 
Focusing, on emergency situations, we observe that the use of discretionary mechanisms is not 
just an opportunity to increase the efficiency of the public procurement, but it becomes almost 
an “obligatory choice”. In emergency procurement situations, most of the constraints relating 
to the contract value are replaced with more discretionary assessments that focus primarily on 
the need for a specific product/service. In those cases, exploiting the derogation of the rules is 
not only allowed but almost obligatory for the contracting authority. Here, the urgency of the 
situation combined with the increasing pressure of stringent deadlines leads to soften the 
rigidity of the public administration. Softening the rule is not without risk: PB can consider an 
emergency as a simple pretext to postpone compliance with the principles of competition and 
transparency of processes. 
In the Italian regulatory framework, the Codice degli Appalti has special rules and derogations 
that may apply in emergency contexts aimed at balancing the needs and risks due to the 
exceptional nature of the situation.  
First, a specific article defines what are the situations of extreme urgency and/or civil protection 
and which immediate actions can be taken. The contracting authority may arrange, 
"simultaneously with the drafting of the report, in which the reasons for the state of urgency, 
the causes that provoked it and the work necessary to remove it are indicated, immediate 
execution of the works within the limit of 200,000 euros or what is necessary to remove the 
state of prejudice to public (and private) safety "(Article 163, co. 1, Codice degli Appalti). 
These contracts can also be awarded without prior price comparison, given the need to supply 
the product/service in a tight time frame. The documents relating to the price and the methods 
used will then be forwarded to the anti-corruption authority which will be responsible for 
carrying out checks on the actual adequacy of the price paid. Furthermore, to the extent strictly 
necessary, the direct assignment may exceptionally be authorized even above the limits referred 
to in comma 1 (i.e. 200,000 euros), for a limited time (Article 163, co. 8, Codice Degli 
Appalti).74 
Other tools that do not directly concern the emergency periods but can be useful as a preventive 
tool for planning and organizing such contexts are the so-called accordi quadro. These 
framework agreements are a type of contract used in public procurement. In particular, these 
agreements involve the reaching of a non-complete agreement.  
Only a general agreement will be stipulated, while other details of the contract will be discussed 
only when their execution becomes necessary.75 For these reasons, this tool is particularly 
 
74 However, this provision may not apply to contracts for an amount equal to or greater than the European Union 
threshold one. 
75 As an example that we will discuss in the next sections, Consip was commissioned to the urgent acquisition of 
personal protective equipment and electro-medical equipment, devices and related services necessary to face the 
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useful in dealing with unpredictable events and sudden emergencies. In emergency 
procurement, it can prove to be an excellent solution to face the difficulties encountered in 
conducting normal negotiations. In emergency procurement, the price paid may increase 
significantly because of the urgent needs of the PB: relying on a preventive agreement helps to 
reduce the risks of potential opportunistic behaviour by private agents and firms.  
 
 
3.1.2  Emergency Procurement and the Risk of Corruption 
In Section 2.3, we analysed the relationship between discretion and the risk of corruption, also 
observing other variables that can influence this relationship. This relation is generally positive: 
lowering restrictions – i.e. granting greater discretion - usually can increase corrupt practices. 
This problem worsens considerably in emergency procurement. Here, opportunities to derogate 
from the rules offer a fertile ground for opportunistic behaviour, both by private contractors and 
by public buyers. 
Corruptive practices usually manifest themselves in two recurring categories. First, the 
violation of rules and regulations relating to public procurement; this can occur with similar 
intensity both in standard and emergency conditions. Second, the misuse of legitimate 
exceptions, which is a special risk of emergency and urgent situations, where exceptions to the 
rules increase considerably.  
The former category includes corrupt practices in the suppliers' selection stage. The timing of 
suppliers’ selection in the emergency phase is shortened to allow a faster response to emerging 
needs. In this way, however, corrupt bureaucrats can take advantage of the possibility of 
inviting only certain bidders, or of skipping directly to the awarding phase.76 
The latter category, following the division made by Schultz and Soreide (2008), can be 
classified into three further types: 
- Misuse of discretionary power: the PB has wide discretion in these phases. It could 
proceed with the purchase of the product/service without comparing offers from 
multiple operators or comparing the qualities and prices available on the market. In this 
way, the opportunity for the PB to justify it with the urgent conditions can offer an 
inviting stimulus to the risk of corruption. 
 
COVID-19 health emergency also in derogation of some specific provisions of the Legislative Decree n. 50/2016. 
Therefore Consip proceeded to translate, within a negotiated procedure without publication of a notice for reasons 
of extreme urgency, a framework agreement. 
76 The contracting authority can notify in advance only the company it wants to favour and the others at a later 
time, so that they are not able to prepare and submit an offer. Furthermore, framework agreements for the 
emergency allow skipping the normal selection procedure, thus favouring incumbent firms that already have 
relations with the public administration (Schultz and Soreide, 2008). 
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- Misusing lax requirement for written justifications: the need to justify purchases by the 
public administration in emergency conditions does not ensure full protection of 
compliance with the regularity of procedures. First, the expectation regarding such 
justifications is relatively secondary, compared to the need to complete the purchase. 
Second, ex-post checks are very difficult to conduct since the information available is 
very limited given the speed of the procedure and the difficulty to assess the goodness 
of the decision taken in certain urgent conditions. 
- Exaggerated emergency: important exceptions to normal procedures are allowed only 
in an emergency. As a result, corrupt suppliers and bureaucrats will support the 
prorogation of these periods as much as possible, so that they can continue to exploit 
them. In these cases, it becomes crucial to constantly update and evaluate if and when 
the conditions and dangers that gave rise to the emergency ceased. 
 
These are some examples of how corruption can infiltrate emergency procurement processes, 
taking advantage of the lower attention to the process itself.77 As already pointed out, the 
contracting authority must not lose sight of the overall effectiveness (i.e. the quality and actual 
usefulness for which the contract is awarded) and the price to obtain it. Although an emergency 
might put these aspects in the background, they should not be neglected.  
The competence of PBs plays also a fundamental role to contain corruption in emergency 
procurement. It is useful to differentiate if the emergency concerns only specific parts of the 
country or it assumes national and/or international dimensions: the competence of bureaucrats 
usually grows as they move from local to central authorities. This difference could also be 
explained by the different availability of economic and technical resources available only to 
central authorities (Chiappinelli, 2019).  
For Italy, a differentiation of events and areas of competence has been arranged by law.78 This 
differentiation refers to natural and/or artificial events (related to human activity). It 
distinguishes events which can be managed by local authorities, because of their limited extent 
and those which require a joint intervention by several entities, coordinating the management 
of the crisis. Additionally, there are specific provisions for emergency situations in which 
immediate action is required. For these, a centralization of the effort to the central authority is 
 
77 The main challenge is to balance the need to safeguard the safety and life of people (usually the main reason for 
a state of emergency) with the need not to leave room for opportunistic behaviour even in these situations. 
Furthermore, the PB must keep the quality-price ratio of the product/service as high as possible, even if the time 
to evaluate these parameters and select the best ones is drastically reduced. 
78 D.L. 59/2012 intervened on art. 2 of Law 225/1992. 
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allowed through the use of extraordinary measures.79 Since a non-homogeneous response 
within the same territory could cause serious efficiency losses, centralizing the organization 
might be desirable. In this way, exploiting the larger skills and resources of central 
governments, the centralization of public procurement processes could also make it possible to 
exploit the advantages deriving from economies of scale, according to the size of the contract 
to be awarded. Finally, different level of competence between local and central entities can also 
support the centralization of purchases in an emergency; differently, each local contracting 
authority should be formed and trained to face emergency situations, increasing the costs of the 
entire process (Dimitri, Piga, and Spagnolo, 2006).  
Additionally, it is not always possible to compare different emergency situations: each one has 
particular causes, characteristics, and effects,80 and a linear interpretation of the phenomenon 
could not be possible. While sharing the same main consequence (a potential risk to the lives 
of citizens), each case should consider the different variables that have influenced it and the 
different subjects involved. 
However, corrupt practices in emergency procurement contexts can be fought and limited. 
Measures to counter the high risk of corruption should intervene when such practices are carried 
out, developing an effective control system. Precautions should also be taken before corruption 
occurs, to prevent the emergence of this phenomenon (Storsjo, et al., 2016). Prevention 
measures in emergency procurement consist of preparing some countermeasures before the 
emergency occurs, to readily respond and to limit its negative effects.  
A valid option discussed above is the use of framework agreements. They allow to consolidate 
relationships with some suppliers, establishing preventive agreements between the parties, 
activating them if the need requires it. In this way, it would be possible to significantly shorten 
the time and pressure associated with the supplier selection during emergency times. 
Furthermore, this would allow reducing the price paid.  
Regardless of whether the PB is corrupt, dealing in an emergency phase constitutes a risk for 
the contracting authority. To face urgent requests, the PB is often forced to accept higher prices 
than those obtainable with negotiation under standard conditions. Indeed, in the latter case, the 
PB can evaluate and choose between offers from multiple bidders. In the former one, this is not 
always possible: private firms increase their bargaining power, taking advantage of the short 
 
79 The possibility of resorting to exceptional means to cope with the emergency is a power that lasts for a limited 
period (established by the various legal systems). In this way, opportunistic behaviours or abuses of this power 
could be limited. 
80 The two most common categories concern natural disasters (such as earthquakes, floods, ...) and health 
emergencies. Although these two areas share some similar aspects, they are characterized by different causes and 
areas of intervention. 
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timeframes in which the public administration must act. Furthermore, firms can exploit the fact 
that, in emergency, the contracting authorities usually have greater funds availability to 
adequately face the situation. As a result, even in the absence of corruption, the evaluation of 
prices and the comparison between them may not be carried out optimally (Schultz and Soreide, 
2008).  
For this reason, it is useful to create a dataset with all the prices paid under previous emergency 
cases and under standard situations. The dataset can be used to evaluate how much these prices 
differ in the different periods, and to detect wastes in the procurement process. Wastes arise for 
two main reasons: the presence of corruption and the inefficiencies in the public procurement 
processes. The latter reason is the preponderant one. This is related, for example, to the lack of 
PBs' competence and the overall bureaucracy inefficiency81 (Bandiera, Prat, and Valletti, 2009). 
During a crisis of relevant intensity and dimension, a centralized response may be desirable. 
This requires an organizational effort that must leave any personal interests in the background 
to give a solid answer to the problem. This also requires an important contribution from the 
authority responsible for coordinating all the parties involved. Any heterogeneous and 
disconnected responses would not have the desired effect and can waste organizational and 
economic resources. 
In addition to the organizational effort, measures should be implemented to monitor whether 
this effort is offering positive results. Otherwise, procurement systems should evaluate whether 
and how to correct and improve them in progress. In emergency situations, it is difficult to 
predict the evolution of the problem. Since emergencies are rare and exceptional events, 
specific intervention protocols are not in place. The capacity of the public administration does 
not lie only in the organization and planning of emergency procurement processes. It refers also 
to the control of these processes and the ability to identify and correct any pitfalls. For this 
reason, the phases and methods of monitoring become crucial in the management of emergency 
procurement. Here, the institution of groups and controls82 could act as a deterrent to corrupt 
practices to achieve the efficiency goals.  
To encourage the search for the best combination of quality and price, an interesting alternative 
could be delegating the decision to the individuals or firms directly affected by the emergency. 
 
81 The so-called “passive waste” accounts for 83% of the total waste. Although active waste remains of a strong 
impact (i.e. episodes of corruption and/or favouritism), the main problem for the public administration is to solve 
the "non-voluntary" inefficiencies Bandiera, Prat, and Valletti, 2009). These inefficiencies exacerbate the problems 
in emergency procurement processes where the external pressure on decisions becomes heavier and processes 
already inefficient under normal conditions can reveal all their weaknesses. 
82 Schultz and Soreide (2008) stressed that the role played by the media and NGOs can also contribute to the 
identification and correction of such practices. Indeed, this type of means often reaches public opinion more easily, 
which is often even more effective in terms of reputational effects than a legal process or other sanctions. 
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The public administration could reimburse them through economic transfers. However, this can 
be a double-edged sword: on the one hand, it can avoid significant waste for products and 
services that are not needed by the end-user; on the other hand, the same amount of economic 
resources could have a lower impact if entrusted to many different small parties. Indeed, a single 
and coordinated response could be able to obtain lower prices by leveraging quantity.  
Finally, the last option to tackle the danger of inefficiencies and corruption in emergency 
procurement processes remains perhaps the most effective, namely sanctions: establishing and 
fixing adequate sanctions for these behaviours can act as an important deterrent in the 
emergency period (Schultz and Soreide, 2008). 
In this section, we have discussed emergency public procurement, knowing that every 
emergency situation occurs for different causes and in different contexts and the comparison 
would offer misleading interpretations. We have tried to overview the main exceptions granted 
by Italian law (and of the European Union, indirectly) in the field of tender contracts and those 
specifically designed for emergency and/or urgent situations. Additionally, we have 
investigated how corruption phenomena can find even more space in the emergency 




3.2  Effects of COVID-19 Emergency at a Regulatory and Procedural Level 
 
In this section, we analyse a real case. We provide evidence about how an emergency condition 
can influence public procurement both from a regulatory and a procedural point of view. In this 
regard, we will refer to one of the greatest global emergencies in recent years: the COVID-19 
pandemic. On January 30th, 2020, the General Director of the World Health Organization 
(WHO) declared that the spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus constitutes a Public Health 
Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC), as enshrined in the International Health 
Regulations (IHR, 2005). On March 11th, the WHO declared it as a pandemic. This declaration 
come as, at the time, the speed and scale of the contagion were increasing and because, despite 
frequent warnings, some countries were not approaching this threat with the adequate level of 
political commitment needed to control it. The spread of the virus has created a health 
emergency at a global level which, although thwarted, still represents a serious threat to people's 
health and life, which has involved practically all countries. It has caused major repercussions 
to the health system, directly affected by the emergency, and even to the economic system, 





3.2.1 Regulatory and Procedural Exceptions 
The COVID-19 pandemic has hit the public procurement processes of many countries. These 
processes had to promptly adapt to the urgent need to counter the spread of the virus and the 
economic and social shock it causes. In this section, we will analyse how Italy (and the EU) has 
dealt with the emergency focusing on public procurement regulation and procedures.   
The health emergency saw a strong intervention from the European Union. First, the EU has 
offered important economic aids to deal with the emergency, used to mitigate the health and 
the socio-economic negative effects of the pandemic. Furthermore, the European Commission 
highlighted the options available to contracting authorities in EU countries, supporting the 
provisions of Directive 2014/24/EU, for the purchase of essential supplies and services.83 The 
European Commission itself has also provided complementary clarifications about the options 
and possibilities available to PBs for all public purchases related to the COVID-19 crisis. 
Through an official communication (2020/C 108 I/01), the Commission allows for a reduction 
in the time required for the award of open or restricted procedures to meet the most stringent 
needs. Additionally, the Commission stressed the possibility of resorting to a negotiated 
procedure without prior publication of the tender notice84 and direct assignment to a selected 
operator (as long as it is the only one able to meet the contractual terms within the specified 
times and methods). The European Union has underlined the wider range of options to 
encourage individual countries to take all necessary countermeasures. 
In Italy, the state of emergency was declared by the Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri on 
January 31st, 2020. Thanks to this, the implementation of the necessary interventions to the 
situation by the Department of Civil Protection was arranged in derogation from any current 
provision and only in compliance with the general principles of the legal system. This initial 
step was followed by various decrees to offer additional flexibility than the one already 
available under “ordinary” emergency situations (i.e. all the exceptions already provided by the 
Codice degli Appalti and described in the previous chapters).  
As discussed in the previous sections, the general trend of the Italian legal system in recent 
years has been towards a lightening and a speeding up of public procurement procedures. These 
adjustments were mainly aimed at encouraging interventions of public utility for the 
modernization of the country. Some examples are the digitization and the sustainability of 
 
83 On April 1st, 2020, in the communication published in the Official Journal of the European Union, the European 
Commission stated that the situation of a health crisis requires rapid supply solutions for goods and services related 
to emergency management. 
84 For Italy: art.63, Codice degli Appalti. 
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public administration measures that incentivize investments, often hampered by lengthy and 
complex procedures. 
The COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated this trend, due to the very stringent conditions and 
timelines faced by the public authorities. One of the first and most important measures adopted 
to address the crisis was the so-called Cura Italia decree.85 The decree introduces some 
exceptions to the general rules set in the Codice degli Appalti (L.D. 50/2016). The decree aimed 
at reducing the timing of the administrative action and the complexity of the process for the 
award of a contract. This would not allow to promptly fulfil the needs dictated by the 
emergency. Until December 31st, 2020, contracts can be awarded through a negotiated 
procedure without prior publication of a tender notice. This was already allowed only when - 
for reasons of extreme urgency deriving from unforeseeable events - the deadlines for ordinary 
procedures could not be respected.86 Some other relevant exceptions concern Article 95 and 
Article 97 of Legislative Decree 50/2016: as for the former article, the decree makes possible 
to use as awarding criterion the lowest price even outside the limits ordinarily allowed; as for 
the latter one, the automatic exclusion mechanism of offers can now be used even beyond the 
original thresholds.87 Additionally, a new figure (Commissario Straordinario) is appointed for 
the implementation and coordination of the measures for the containment and contrast of the 
COVID-19 emergency. This figure has the main task of implementing and supervising any 
intervention useful to deal with a health emergency. It has to organize and manage the purchase 
of each product/supply needed for containing and countering the emergency. In the next section, 
we will analyse the role played by this figure in the procurement of goods/services during the 
first months of the emergency.  
Another relevant modification applied by the Cura Italia decree regards the controls on the 
procedures applied for COVID-19 needs. It removes the documents relating to the purchase of 
goods during the emergency from the control of the Corte dei Conti, limiting the "accounting 
and administrative responsibility" to only cases in which the official's fraud has been 
ascertained.88 
At the Italian regulatory level, perhaps the most significant change during this period concerns 
the so-called D.l. Semplificazioni.89 This decree intervened significantly in public procurement 
procedures to deal with the emergency period. First, the decree derogated from art. 36 co. 2 
 
85 L.D. n. 18, 17 marzo 2020. 
86 Art. 63, co.2, lett. c) , Codice degli Appalti. 
87 This derogation can only be applied if there are at least 5 offers. 
88 This rule is subject to evaluation as regards its compliance with the Constitution. 
89 D.L. 76/2020. Initially, the name refers to the D.L. n. 135/2018, whose conversion law (no. 12/2019) was 
approved in the Gazzetta Ufficiale in 2019. The new decree concerns the approval of a maxi amendment, 
introduced to deal with the COVID-19 emergency. 
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letter a), Codice degli Appalti90: it provided that direct assignment for service and supply 
contracts is allowed up to 150,000 euros91 (in any case, within the limits of the thresholds 
according to Article 35, until 31 July 202192). Note that the decree allows to use this procedure, 
but it does not mandate it,93 leaving wide margins of discretion to the contracting authority in 
entrusting the ordinary procedures. About contracts with a value equal to or greater than 
150,000 euros (within the limits of the EU thresholds), the decree makes possible to use the 
negotiated procedure without notice according to Article 63, after consulting at least 5 economic 
operators94 and in compliance with other requirements in the selection of suppliers.95 This 
temporary derogation regime aims to incentivize public investments and to cope with the 
negative economic effects resulting from the containment and emergency measures of COVID-
19.  
Further constraints have been introduced to support a speeding up of the supplier selection and 
identification processes: for direct assignments, the PB must select the winning firm within two 
months from the initiation of the procedure; for the negotiated procedure, the term increases to 
four months. The supplier selection and awarding procedure for contracts above the threshold 
must take place within six months of the start of the procedure, underlining the will of the 
legislator to encourage a strong reduction in the awarding times. 
As regards above-threshold works, the new temporary regulation provides for the applicability 
of the restricted procedure or, in the cases provided for by law, of the competitive procedure 
with negotiation following the articles n.61 and n.62 of the Codice degli Appalti (Lgs.D. 
50/2016).96 This derogation refers to procedures started before 31 December 2021.  
Art.2, co.3, L.D. “Semplificazioni” expands the use of the negotiated procedure without prior 
publication of a tender notice for the activities of execution of works, services, and supplies as 
 
90 Article 36, co. 2, lett. a), Codice degli Appalti allowed the use of the direct award procedure for contracts with 
a value of less than 40,000 euros. 
91 For engineering and architecture contracts, the limit drops to 75,000 euros 
92 With an amendment, the provisions referred to in articles 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 and 8 of the D.L. Semplificazioni have 
been extended to 31 December 2021. 
93 There is no change to Article 36, co. 1, Codice degli Appalti. 
94 For higher amounts, the negotiated procedure without public tender can be used, after consulting an increasing 
number of economic operators depending on the value of supplies, services and works. The consultation of at least 
5 companies for works between 150,000 and 350,000 euros of value, 10 economic operators for works from 
350,000 to 1 million euros, 15 up to 5 million. 
95 In compliance with a criterion of rotation of the invitations, which also considers a different geographical 
location of the invited bidders, identified on the basis of market surveys or through lists of economic operators. 
96 Articles 61 and 62 refer to the ordinary sectors, while the special sectors follow the articles 123 and 124 of the 
Codice degli Appalti. The contracting authorities must proceed through the negotiated procedure - art. 63 
Procurement code for the ordinary sectors and art. 125 for the special ones - for the awarding of the execution of 
works, services, and supplies as well as engineering and architecture services of works for an amount equal to or 
greater than the EU thresholds. For the competitive procedure with negotiation, only invited operators can submit 
an offer following the evaluation of the information provided. This rule has raised some criticisms as it could 
exempt from motivating these decisions. It could open up the possibility of opportunistic behaviors by public 
officials (ANCE, 2020). 
71 
 
well as engineering and architectural services. This procedure is now permitted for an amount 
equal to or greater than the EU thresholds when the terms, even if shortened, provided for by 
ordinary procedures cannot be respected. Additionally, when the exceptional use of the 
negotiated procedure is required, the following comma 4 specifies that this is possible in 
derogation from any provision of the law. The only exceptions concern compliance with 
criminal law and the provisions of the Codice Antimafia laws and prevention measures (Lgs.D. 
159/2011).97 
Another significant change concerns the management of legal disputes arising from the 
emergency procedures. These disputes and litigations risk blocking the procurement process. 
For this reason, when it comes to pandemic-related purchases, these disputes need to be 
resolved faster than under ordinary procedures since supplies of greater urgency may depend 
on them. To settle these disputes, the L.D. 76/2020 provides for the mandatory establishment 
of a Collegio Consultivo Tecnico98 (CCT) for above-threshold contracts. It is a contract-specific 
committee that has the task of checking the regularity of the proceedings as well as the right to 
suspend them (Article 6, L.D. 76/2020). It must be composed of three or five members with 
specific requirements and chosen by mutual agreement between the parties. The Italian anti-
corruption authority - ANAC - complained about the creation of CCTs. In particular, ANAC 
highlighted two potentially critical issues: first, it is not clear how this committee should relate 
to the existing mechanisms for the protection and resolution of disputes; second, since it is an 
onerous tool and its establishment must take place for each of the contracts above the threshold, 
it represents a huge cost for the public administration (Report ANAC, August 4th, 2020). 99 
The introduction of all these derogations has opened a debate about their application. It has 
been argued that, under the new rules, an excessive discretion is left to the contracting authority 
and at the redundancy of some provisions since some cases would already be provided for in 
the Codice degli Appalti for emergency conditions. Through a comment on the decree, ANAC 
stressed that a greater enhancement of the institutions already provided for by the code would 
have been desirable. Instead, the addition of further provisions risks burdening and 
complicating the interpretation of potentially contradictory rules, obtaining the opposite 
effect.100 An example of the repetition, in the new decrees, of a provision already existing in 
 
97 The constraints of the European Union are maintained, including those deriving from directives 2014/24/EU 
and 2014/25/EU, the principles referred to in articles 30, 34 and 42 of the Codice degli Appalti and the provisions 
on subcontracting. 
98 The previous provisions of the D.L. 32/2019 (“Sblocca Cantieri”) provided only the faculty and not the 
obligation to establish a CCT. This provision repeals the previous one until December 31st, 2021. 
99 Art.6, co.6 e 7, L.D. 76/2020. 
100 This difficulty is evident in the relationship between the EU rules that must be adhered to and the opposing 
discretion in certain areas left to the Member States. 
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the code (Lgs.D. 50/2016) is about the use of the negotiated procedure without prior publication 
of the tender notice. This is already provided for in art. 63, Codice degli Appalti.101 The same 
applies to the procedures of extreme urgency or civil protection, which are already governed 
by art. 163 of the Codice degli Appalti. In addition to this, the reduction of the deadlines for the 
requests to participate in the tender was already contemplated in the code.102  
Another controversial aspect concerns the effects of these measures on the efficiency and 
effectiveness of public procurement processes. One of the main risks associated with 
emergency procurement is the exploitation of less stringent constraints in contracts that do not 
fall within the purpose for which the exceptions are designed (see Section 3.1). The definition 
of "COVID-19 emergency works" (Comma 4, L.D. 76/2020) is considered excessively vague 
and therefore susceptible to "include any infrastructural intervention".103 According to 
ANCE,104 Comma 4 would allow to apply these procedures to all interventions (including those 
below the threshold) relating to school, university, etc. Furthermore, the lowering of the 
publicity requirements for these tenders risks compromising the principle of supplier rotation 
and "cancelling the possibility for a group of companies to submit an offer in a temporary 
partnership". As a result, the simplification of the processes would focus on the deregulation of 
the procedures, leading to a reduction in competition. Instead, the amendments should have 
intervened in the qualification processes at the beginning of the tender. According to ANCE, 
most of the interruptions in the public tenders are in that qualification phase (70%, following 
the analysis of the association).  
Finally, a further point of contention concerns the awarding criteria. Under the original 
provisions, the lowest price criterion is allowed for: services and supplies with standardized 
characteristics or whose conditions are defined by the market; for services and supplies with a 
value up to 40,000 euros.105 Lett. b) of art. 2, L.D. 76/2020 provides that the PB can decide (for 
the negotiated procedure) whether to apply the criterion of the most economically advantageous 
offer. Considering also Article 2, comma 1 of Lgs.D. 50/2016, it increases the possibility of 
 
101 As also claimed by ANAC in the aforementioned comment, the derogation from art. 63 would not have been 
necessary in relation to the COVID-19 emergency. This article is already clear enough to allow contracting 
authorities to resort to the negotiated procedure in all cases where reasons of extreme urgency arise (ANAC, 
August 4th, 2020). 
102 For open procedures: art. 60, comma 3; for restricted procedures: art. 61; for the award of contracts below the 
threshold: art. 36, comma 9, Codice degli Appalti. 
103 "D.L. Semplificazioni (D.L. 76/2020). Commentary on the measures of the decree ”, July 17th, 2020. According 
to these estimates, these lacks risk excessively deregulating the process, leading to non-transparent assignment of 
about 94 billion euros, which corresponds to 4 years of investments in public works. 
104 A.N.C.E., Associazione Nazionale Costruttori Edili (Italian association of builders) 
105 This also applies to contracts above this threshold up to the EU threshold characterized by high repetitiveness. 
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using this criterion also with the direct award procedure. It could create many problems with 
the transparency and efficiency of the process, incentivizing corrupt practices.106 
These criticisms highlight the difficulty for the legislator to find a compromise even in 
conditions of emergency procurement. The need to speed up and lighten public procurement 
processes must consider the risk that faster procedures entail in terms of disputes and the risk 
of corruption. Furthermore, these measures have also an impact on the competition between 
suppliers, a key element on which to build an efficient process (see Section 2.2). The decision 
of which procedure to use is made even more complicated by the pressure given by the time 
within which certain decisions must be made, in order to ensure a prompt and effective response 
to the emergency.  
This section represents a quick summary of the main regulatory interventions taken by the 
Italian government to deal with the COVID-19 emergency, up to January 2021. Although their 
analysis from a legal point of view is outside the scope of this thesis, their description is 
important to understand the differences between emergency procedures, under the new rules, 
and ordinary procedures, presented in the previous chapters.107  
 
 
3.2.2  The main effects of COVID-19 Emergency on Public Procurement 
The COVID-19 emergency has affected almost all the dynamics and aspects of our society. The 
most affected sector is the healthcare sector, where the main direct effects of the emergency 
occurred. Being a health emergency, this sector was the first to face its consequences. Important 
measures were taken to contain and counter the rampant spread of the virus. Especially in the 
first months, people cannot leave their house except for proven needs. These measures have 
helped in reducing the health-care consequences of the emergency, but they had a significant 
impact in other sectors. The resulting economic crisis has had effects on people's lives. These 
effects will be even worse if we are not able to foresee the long-term consequences of the 
pandemic, and the public procurement sector is no exception to that. 
 
106 The use of direct assignment procedures is strongly discouraged under standard conditions. Various studies 
have highlighted the increase in the average price paid by contracting authorities. For example, the OECD 
estimated that competitive tenders by the Mexican Institute of Social Security resulted in a price 11.2% to 11.9% 
lower than the price achieved through direct awards or tenders restricted to few suppliers (OECD, 2018). Although 
the emergency requires greater use of this type of procedure, OECD invites you to limit its use even in emergency 
procurement conditions (OECD, 2020). 
107 The discussion of another important decree approved during the emergency phase was deliberately omitted: the 
Decreto “Rilancio”. The L.D. 34/2020 (May, 19th, 2020) introduced some changes to the ordinary procedures, 
including the advance of the price paid by the contracting authority which can go from 20% to 30% of the total 
award price, compatibly with the available resources. 
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Our analysis aims at assessing how the procurement processes' performances have been 
affected by the emergency. To gain a better understanding, we use a report provided by ANAC 
which collects the data about the procurement contracts (identified by a CIG or smart-CIG108) 
in the period March-April 2020, the period immediately after the beginning of the 
emergency.109 At a regulatory level, the ANAC report was published after the approval of the 
“Cura Italia” decree,110 but before the approval of the Legislative Decree 76/2020. 
The ANAC report shows how the main indicators (i.e. price, quality of the supplies, delivery 
time, compliance with the technical and legal requirements) about public procurement process 
reacted to the new procedures. The report studies various aspects in consideration of the 
incidence of these on the total number of contracts and in relation to the overall expenditure.  
The total expenditure in this period amounts to almost € 5.8 billion: 94.1% deriving from 
procedures for an amount equal to or greater than € 40,000 (CIG); 5.9% from procedures for 
contracts of a value less than € 40,000 or subject only to the traceability obligations (smart-
CIG). These percentages are reversed if we look at the number of tenders: 94.1% from 
procedures subject only to traceability obligations and 5.9% from procurement procedures for 
an amount equal to or greater than 40,000 euros. 
One focus of our work is the analysis of the adopted procedures in the COVID-19 emergency 
context. Referring to data provided by the ANAC Report (2020), we observe that the procedures 
that require a certain degree of publicity111 (usually the most used in standard conditions, 
strongly encouraged by the various legal systems) account for only 4.4% of the total number of 
awarded contracts in the period considered. Their incidence increases slightly relating to the 
total expenditure, with a percentage settling at 5.2%. It clearly emerges that almost all the 
tenders have been awarded through procedures using a lower degree of publicity: 61.9% 
through a negotiated procedure without prior publication of the tender notice, while 23,5% 
through direct assignment to a supplier. The weight of these two procedures alone is even 
greater when considered the overall value of the contracts awarded: 92.9% of the total 
expenditure in these phases was allocated through them.  
 
108 CIG (Codice Identificativo di Gara) is an alphanumeric code generated by the SIMOG computer system (a tool 
useful to monitor the tenders) of ANAC. This code allows to identify a given contract signed with the public 
administration following a contract or assignment. It is a code that must be indicated in the documents relating to 
a given tender. 
109 The data reported by ANAC refer to the period from March to April 2020. This period includes the outbreak of 
the emergency and the immediately following phase. As this is the first response phase, this suggests that the 
values and data available should also be weighed considering the plausible initial confusion and the need to 
organize a response in a situation where the causes and potential consequences were still little known. 
110 L.D. 18/2020 of March 17th, 2020. The analysis refers to a period in which this decree was approved, failing to 
fully grasp the differences between the ex-ante and ex-post situation. The same thing applies to the effects of the 
measures adopted after the publication of this report. 
111 This includes open and restricted procedures, negotiated procedures with prior publication of the tender notice 
and the so-called “dynamic purchasing system”. 
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Considering only the procedures that do not require the publication of the notice (direct award 
procedure and negotiated procedure without prior publication of the notice), they were used in 
85% of the total number of contracts. Additionally, we note that contracts under 150,000 euros 
account for most of the total (67.3%) but they only represent 3.2% of the total expenditure. This 
inverse relationship between the incidence in the quantity and in the total value of the contracts 
is supported if the sample is split at the threshold of 5,000,000 euros: although contracts below 
the threshold account for 96.7% of the total number of awarded contracts, and those above the 
threshold for the remaining 3.3%, the latter account for about 80% of the total expenditure (Fig. 
5112).  
Direct assignment related to pre-existing framework agreements is used in 9.8% of the contracts 
examined (even if the value on the overall expenditure accounts for only 2% of the total).  This 
evidence underlines the wide peculiarities of the emergency procurement processes. In these 
situations, PBs are more likely to select procedures that do not involve high publicity 
requirements. This may occur for opposite reasons: on the one hand, the need for faster 
purchases using less complex methods; on the other hand, the lack of publicity, i.e. lower 
transparency, can be exploited to favour corrupt practices (see Section 2.3).  
The most important element to assess the effect of the emergency on the procurement process 
is the price paid, as it can be an useful indicator to assess the efficiency of public procurement. 
 
112 Figure 1. “Indagine conoscitiva sugli affidamenti in regime emergenziale di forniture e servizi sanitari connessi 
al trattamento ed al contenimento dell’epidemia da COVID 19 – Report di seconda fase, 13/08/2020.” Another 
interesting aspect is the average amount of contracts awarded through a direct award procedure (€ 724,000) and 
those assigned through a negotiated procedure without prior notice (€ 1,141,000), significantly increasing the 
average amounts for which these procedures are usually awarded. 
Source: ANAC Report, 13/08/2020 
Figure 5. Distribution of the Procedures by Contract Value 
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In particular, we discuss prices paid in the health-care procurement. Unlike other emergencies 
(such as earthquakes or floods), the COVID-19 one had a strong impact on the supply side. The 
obligation to limit social contacts and the closure of many activities were and still are the main 
measures adopted in almost all countries. The closure of the activities stopped many production 
activities which, although not essential, played important roles in the supply chains. 
Additionally, the increasing demand for certain goods has led to a rapid depletion of stocks. 
In the procurement of healthcare devices, this shock radically altered the market with respect 
to its pre-pandemic business situation. There are several reasons why prices increased. First, 
standard economic forces due to high demand and low supply. Second, speculation and 
opportunistic behaviours. Finally, in a public procurement framework, greater suppliers' 
bargaining power and fewer controls in the selection phase. The supply of personal protective 
equipment (PPE) represents a clear example of what just described: the strong demand, the 
limited availability, and the supply crisis led to a sharp rise in prices in the early stages.  
In the ANAC Report (2020) it is possible to observe these effects on the prices related to the 
purchase by Consip S.p.A. of FFP2 masks (Fig. 6113). Although the reference price range is 
between two and five euros, important peaks are evident in the first phase (until a maximum of 
nine euros). This suggests that, in emergency situations, the variability of supply and demand 
considerably conditions the market and the public administration, as well. After an initial 
 
113 Figure 2. “Indagine conoscitiva sugli affidamenti in regime emergenziale di forniture e servizi sanitari connessi 
al trattamento ed al contenimento dell’epidemia da COVID-19 – Report di seconda fase, 13/08/2020.” 
Source: ANAC Report, 13/08/2020 
Figure 6. Price of FFP2 Masks 
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increase, the price has stabilized thanks to the important quantities purchased and the reduction 
of the emergency peak demand. Furthermore, it should be noted that these values refer to the 
most important central purchasing body in Italy. These results are even worse if the purchasing 
process is delegated to entities with fewer resources in terms of competencies and bargaining 
power, leading to higher prices for the same quantities. This characteristic can also be found in 
the comparison between the prices paid by centralized buyers and the prices paid by local 
authorities (in health emergencies, some purchases have been delegated to the regional level).114 
Another important indicator is the quality of supply in emergency procurement. This evaluation 
includes compliance with the timing and technical requirements set out in the tender notice 
about the products/services. ANAC analysed the feedback received from 163 contracting 
authorities to evaluate the performance delivered by the various suppliers during the initial 
emergency period. Contrary to what expected, the general results are quite positive with regard 
to the procedures implemented to deal with the health emergency.115  
Differently, focusing on specific product categories the results are more variable. Always as 
regards the supply of FFP2 masks (the most critical case), it showed delays in about 25% of 
cases. Such delays may also be partly justified by reasons beyond the supplier’s control.116 The 
negative outcome is also confirmed with regard to compliance with the quality and quantities 
applied for. Additionally, there were also problems with the regularity of the process, with 5% 
of the contracts in which the suppliers did not have the requirements to participate in the tender.  
While these assessments are very useful, they should nevertheless be read considering that these 
responses come from public contractors and not from objective measures. Given the short time 
span considered, they could offer more insights once analysed in the long-term, understanding 





114 This issue will be discussed in the next section. To give an example, as regards the unit prices of FFP2 masks, 
we note how the average price varies between € 2.20 (PCM-Civil Protection) and € 7.50 for Regione Lazio. The 
issue relating to the aggregation and centralization of emergency purchases has already been mentioned previously 
and will be further explored in relation to the COVID-19 emergency, thanks to the data available. 
115 Deliberazione del Consiglio dei Ministri del 31/01/2020; decreto del CDPC del 27/02/2020; OCDPC n. 
630/2020 e n. 639/2020; D.L. 02/03/2020 n. 9; D.L. 17/03/2020 n. 18; European Commission C/108/I/I). 
116 Such as customs blocks, logistics compromised by the restrictions of the emergency period, reduced production 





3.3 COVID-19 Procurement and the Need for Competence 
 
In this section, we will focus on the management of emergency procurement processes.  
Thanks to the kind cooperation of the Procurement Office (University of Padua), we will 
highlight the main countermeasures adopted to deal with the COVID-19 crisis in terms of 
procurement procedures, and the critical issues that have emerged. The discussion took place 
with Dr. Infante, Dr. Paluan and Dr. Pieressa (Procurement Office, Unipd). Referring to the 
experience of this contracting authority running centralized public procurement for the 
University of  Padua, we now first frame what discussed in the previous sections: starting from 
information on real procurement activity offered in the interview, we present our considerations 
on examples of the COVID-19 emergency procurement. A list of questions posed in the 
interview is in Appendix to this thesis.  
Finally, we will focus on competence, a very important factor that influences the application of 
discretion in standard and emergency public procurement processes. Competence will be 




3.3.1 The Management of COVID-19 Procurement in the University of Padua 
Italian universities are public bodies and they are part of the public administration. However, 
they enjoy a certain degree of regulatory, management, and budgetary autonomy. While 
representing a unicum among public entities, universities are also subject to public awarding 
procedures, through which they can award contracts for the supply of goods and services of 
public utility. 
Within the various universities, the individual departments usually enjoy relative autonomy 
with regard to budget and expenditure. Despite this, all universities have an internal office that 
deals with making purchases on behalf of the central administration and to meet the need for 
aggregation of specific interdepartmental procedures. 
The University of Padua delegates these tasks to a specific area, the Area Patrimonio, 
Aprrovvigionamento e Logistica (APAL). This area is divided internally into four offices: the 
Procurement Office, the Tender Office, the Goods and Services Management Office and the 
Assets and Logistics Office. 
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Most of the tenders held by the University's central administration offices are managed through 
e-procurement. E-procurement consists of the purchasing of goods and services through an 
electronic platform. It does not represent a different type of procurement but it is a different 
mean to manage the processes. The University of Padua has set up its own Electronic Market, 
called “MEUnipd”, using the MEPA117 (“Mercato Elettronico Pubblica Amministrazione” / 
Public Administration Electronic Market) platform already available for public administrations. 
MEUnipd reflects the specificities of the University in the procurement of goods and services 
for amounts lower than the EU threshold. Registration on the portal and the qualification for at 
least one category is an indispensable prerequisite for the economic operator to obtain and/or 
maintain its authorization to access the electronic market.  
The management of this platform is entrusted to a specific sector of the purchasing area, the 
Procurement Office. This office is divided into two sectors: the one dedicated to purchasing 
planning (Area Programmazione / Planning Office) and the one dedicated to e-procurement. 
Thanks to the thoughtful discussions with the managers of these two sectors, we have 
extrapolated important insights to complement what has already been highlighted in the 
previous chapters. 
The University of Padua is a unique body consisting of 32 Departments that have a budget and 
spending autonomy with respect to the central administration and that can select the awarding 
procedures autonomously. Below the 214,000 euros threshold, the main awarding procedures 
used by the university are: the direct assignment with a request for an estimate for contracts up 
to € 75,000; the negotiated procedure with a minimum of five invited suppliers for contracts 
worth between € 75,000 and 214,000 euros. Above the threshold, the open procedure is the 
most used one (as required by European Union directives).  
The high-value contracts are managed by the central administration. It also manages the 
procurement of those goods/services of common utility118 and coordinates the needs of the 
departments to exploit the advantages of potential aggregate procedures for goods/services 
required by multiple departments.119 This leads to considerable advantages due to the greater 
bargaining power, stronger protection in case of non-fulfilment, and greater consideration of 
suppliers, allowing for better procurement conditions. Besides, the individual Departments 
usually do not have the larger number of skilled personnel dedicated to public purchases, as the 
 
117 In accordance with art. 36, paragraph 6, of the Codice degli Appalti which establishes that "in order to carry 
out the procedures referred to in this article, the contracting authorities can proceed through an electronic market 
that allows telematic purchases based on a system that implements procedures for choosing the contractor entirely 
managed electronically." 
118 For example cleaning services, porterage, audio-video systems, catering, etc.. 
119 A recent example is the procurement contract for helium (necessary in the laboratories of several departments), 
managed by the central administration's Purchasing Office. 
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central administration has. In this way, the Departments can delegate these complex activities 
to more competent bodies, focusing on their main mission.  
Indeed, in recent years there has been in the university a trend towards a progressive 
centralization of purchasing processes. The central offices coordinate needs to reduce the 
number of procedures and to avoid duplications. On the other side, some departments struggle 
to delegate certain procedures, given that they are able to make the purchase more quickly, 
without waiting for a centralized call for tenders. This can create unnecessary overlaps between 
departments’ purchasing, that only a central coordination between the parties can help to avoid.  
In addition to ordinary contracts, in the COVID-19 emergency, the University has had to deal 
with new needs and operating methods. The new needs refer to purchases in the health-care 
sector for the prevention and contrast of the emergency and for the implementation of new 
teaching methods, which required significant adaptations. Those required significant 
adaptations in the procurement process. In the interview, it emerged that there is often an 
excessive focus on fixed administrative procedures, rather than adapting them to the market 
situation in which they are carried out. In particular, during the emergency, the need to procure 
a good/service represents the priority. The procedures should favour this goal, rather than 
slowing down the dynamics of the process. Despite the risks of corruption and opportunistic 
behaviours, focusing on the effectiveness of the procedures rather than the on the procedure 
itself allows contracting authorities to overcome obstacles in the tender phase and to conclude 
the purchasing in a reasonable period of time. 
Additionally, an excessive focus on the compliance with an administrative procedure moves 
away the focus from what needs to be evaluated in emergency situations: the market. In this 
sense, the impact on the procedures may be considered as the final link in a chain: the main 
effect is on the markets, which force the regulatory system to create alternatives to the ordinary 
procedures to face this variability. Indeed, emergency procurement affected the procedures, but 
as a consequence of the variability of the market conditions. 
After the outbreak of the pandemic, most public and private businesses had to react as quickly 
as possible to the resulting travel restrictions. The main response was to encourage agile 
working, teleworking and e-learning for educational institutions. This has led to an exponential 
increase in the demand for devices to adapt to the new conditions. The PC market is a striking 
example. The demand for PCs has burned companies' inventories in a short time, and the 
production has slowed down for the COVID-19 restrictions. 
The University of Padua had to face this problem, especially in the second phase of the 
emergency. It had to procure 1,700 computers, necessary for the Concorso Nazionale di 
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Medicina on September 22nd, 2020.120 Here, the problem was not the presence of constraints in 
the awarding procedure, but the constraints imposed by the product availability in the market 
and the constrain belonging to the use of pc in the Concorso. All the recent decrees gave wide 
derogations on the procedure’s rules. Unfortunately, this flexibility would not solve the supply-
side problem deriving from the non-availability of the product. Before choosing the best 
procedures, the PB should worry about finding the needed product and the channel that makes 
it available. This research led to directly contacting the few suppliers able to satisfy these 
requests to test and evaluate the feasibility of the operation. In this situation, given the potential 
effects of a missed purchase,121 it was necessary to directly contact the suppliers to compare 
prices and delivery times. This had to be done while the product was already in production, 
since waiting for commercialization meant risking not to find availability given the always high 
demand. Therefore, this procedure was the only possible way to obtain the product in the 
desired time. 
For high-value contracts,122 the ordinary law provides for the use of the open European 
procedure. However, the emergency conditions and the strong need to avoid the failure of the 
supply led to the implementation of unconventional procedures, always remaining within the 
statutory limits. In this framework, there is an obligation for the PB to justify any decision. In 
particular, the main concern for the PB was the compliance with the principles of the Codice 
degli Appalti. In the case of procurement of 1,700 computers, the principle of transparency was 
met by giving publicity to all the steps of the procedures; additionally, the technical report was 
written, to explain that this choice was the only possible one. Furthermore, even if minimal, the 
competition was protected by comparing the estimates of three suppliers, the only ones able to 
satisfy the requests within the desired times.  
Although covered by legal protection, this is an example of how urgent conditions provide for 
atypical and unconventional solutions.123 Even in discretionary procedures, remarkably 
different from canonical ones, what mainly matters is the approach with which the contracting 
authority acts and the purposes it wants to pursue. For a public service body, these purposes 
must always be linked to the public service, before any personal interests. In emergency 
situations, these requirements and the clear transparent motivation of the decisions represent 
 
120 This situation was aggravated by the difficult planning and organization activities, with the provisions of the 
Ministry (MIUR) received at the beginning of August. 
121 Considering the disputes and litigations that a cancellation of the event could have provoked. 
122 The total value of the contract for the supply of about 1,700 laptops was around 1,000,000 euros. 
123 Always bearing in mind the obligation to provide an adequate and valid reason for the choice made and the 
existence of such conditions. 
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crucial factors even for the reputation of the contracting authority.124 Indeed, the relationship 
with suppliers and all the stakeholders is another point of pressure for the public buyer which, 
if not properly managed, can lead to disputes and litigations.125  
We now introduce another example of PB’s discretion in a procurement process undertaken by 
the University of Padua, concerning new teaching methods. E-learning has forced many 
institutions to offer online and in a short time a service that was previously offered face to face. 
The University had to guarantee the dual teaching service, providing the technical infrastructure 
by the beginning of the lessons in October. For this reason, it carried out three assignment 
procedures for the modernization of the audio-video systems of approximately 400 classrooms. 
Five suppliers (including an innovative start-up) were selected using a negotiated procedure 
with a limited number of economic operators.126  
Here, the discretion was applied to the suppliers' selection. The contracting authority selected 
them on the basis of technical feasibility and size requirements and not only on objective criteria 
such as price. Although the price is still relevant, in emergency situations the assessment of 
feasibility is decisive. In normal tenders, the choice of an unreliable contractor leads to delays 
and possible disputes that can be remedied. Differently, in these situations, mistakes in the 
selection of the contractor could stop the execution of the work, with reduced opportunities to 
remedy before a stringent deadline. This evaluation is even more important because errors in 
the selection phase are difficult to detect in the short time frame this procurement process has 
been run.  
An example of this issue was the procurement of protective masks. The lack of availability, the 
immediate need, and the presence of opportunistic suppliers led to purchases of devices with 
false or unsuitable certificates. For these healthcare products, errors on the certifications lead 
to serious, potentially life-threatening consequences. These problems have exacerbated the 
danger of obtaining certain goods at prices that are anomalously lower than the average ones 
but with serious shortcomings in their technical characteristics. In these situations, the urgent 
need for masks has led many firms to convert production to meet the demand for these goods. 
 
124 Another example that emerged from the interview concerns the hospital of Padua which exploited pre-existing 
agreements with some suppliers, extending them for 6 months. Once the critical phase of the emergency has been 
overcome, it has called a tender through an open procedure to assign and extend the supply. This option was 
allowed thanks to the report of the entity which explained the reasons for the choice and the urgent need to proceed 
with the purchase. This choice represents an example of an atypical use of discretion but which represented the 
only possible alternative to satisfy the request in the necessary time. 
125 From the interview, it emerged that, in these particular situations, suppliers are much more pressing regarding 
compliance with principles such as the rotation between firms and about the reasons with which suppliers are 
invited. 
126 Always ensuring compliance with the minimum number of suppliers to be invited. 
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Sometimes, this has led PBs to purchase non-certified products, given the low prices and the 
strong external pressure. 
A crucial aspect in the evaluation and selection of the supplier is the level of competence and 
skills of the PB. In the previous chapter, we already explored this issue in relation to the degree 
of discretion granted to the contracting authority, and its impact on the procurement process. 
Through data and analyses, Section 2.2 shows how the effects of discretion are only a 
consequence of the level of competence through which such discretion is employed. 
In an ordinary tender, the PB’s lack of specific skills can be partially hidden by the strict 
adherence to procedures and the possibility of remedying potential errors. Differently, 
competence plays a relevant role in an emergency procurement tender. Here, the PB resorts to 
procedures that require greater skills to adapt to emergency needs. Furthermore, in situations 
of urgency, any mistake can mean serious losses both from an economic and also from a human 
point of view. 
The managers of the University of Padua’s procurement office stated that one of their office’s 
key characteristic is the presence of competent employees. A strength of this office is its 
multidisciplinary approach, which can address the problems by combining employees’ skills 
and knowledge. They stressed that, within the same office, there are figures who have 
economic, legal, and engineering background. The combination of several skills makes the 
purchasing process as efficient and effective as possible from an economic point of view. From 
a legal perspective, competent figures make it easier to manage administrative procedures. 
Furthermore, at the technical-engineering level, engineers allow to prepare more effective calls 
for tenders and to verify much faster the possession of the requirements by the bidders, 
significantly reducing the number of disputes. Finally, in addition to the specificity of the skills 
in the various sectors to which they belong, the relevant aspect is that all the managers of the 
Procurement Office (Unipd) we interviewed had past experience in the procurement sector, 
both at a private and at a public level. 
The COVID-19 pandemic has clearly shown the shortcomings of public administration lacking 
competence and skills. This has reinforced the need for a professionalization of civil servants 
in procurement offices. An example brought by the interviewees was the comparison with the 
Dutch case, in which there are schools and universities dedicated to training figures in charge 
of public procurement, offering a wide range of skills to obtain improvements in the medium-
long-term on performance.127 Although these qualities should be the fundament of each 
purchasing body, they represent the main cause of public procurement inefficiencies. As 
 
127 As an example, the Centre for Public Procurement (UUCePP) in Utrecht. 
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documented in papers about institutions in other EU countries, we observe how most of the 
employees in procurement offices do not have the skills or experience to fill certain roles 
(Chever and Moore, 2012).128 This represents a serious issue for the efficiency of the public 
procurement processes and involves many other countries. 
 
 
3.3.2 Centralization and the Need for Competence 
The interview on Procurement Office of the University of Padua gives an opportunity i) to 
analyse the importance of competence in emergency procurement and ii) to study how 
procurement outcomes could be affected by the degree of centralization and the level of 
competence vary. Indeed, the competence of PBs usually grows as they move from local to 
central authorities. Different outcomes could also be explained by the different availability of 
economic and technical resources available to central authorities (Chiappinelli, 2019). 
To overcome the lack of competent figures at the local level, the only alternative in the short 
term is represented by the centralization of purchases. In emergency settings, the centralization 
of purchasing processes is a trend common in almost all countries. In Italy, centralization has 
been implemented both through entities that already existed under standard conditions and/or 
through entities created in an extraordinary way to deal with this situation. 
The most important central purchasing body at the national level is Consip S.p.A.. It ordinarily 
manages procedures at the national level, aggregating the purchasing of other bodies. It employs 
more than 400 employees. Consip was not the most important centralized body to which 
procurement procedures were delegated. Other important entities have carried out much of the 
procurement in the early stages of the emergency. Among these, the most important are the 
Settore degli Organi Centrali (Central Bodies’ Sector), which includes the procedures 
implemented by the Commissario Straordinario (Special Commissioner) for the emergency, 
and the Dipartimento di Protezione Civile (Civil Defence). 
The ANAC report for the period March-April 2020 noted how the expenditure was distributed 
among the various entities at a central level (Fig. 7129). The first evidence that emerges is the 
percentage of centralized expenditure on the total: 78.4%.130 Almost half of the expenditure 
 
128 In France, 61% of public procurement employees does not have past experience in this field (Saussier and 
Tirole, 2015). 
129 Data: ANAC Report, 13/08/2020. 
130 The expenditure deriving from centralization instruments officially accounts for 37.3% of the expenditure for 
the emergency, 2.16 billion in absolute terms. However, this calculation does not include the expenses incurred by 
the Commissario Straordinario and the Civil Protection Department which impact for 41.1% of the total, as they 
are not considered as aggregation tools, but as separate procurement contracts. If combined, the total reaches 78.4% 
(4.5 billion) (ANAC report, 13/08/2020). 
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incurred in the period for the implementation of measures and the procurement of goods and 
services to combat the emergency was supported by the Settore degli Organi Centrali131 and 




Although the trend in the emergency tenders moves towards the centralization of purchases, we 
note that there are many central purchasing bodies. Additionally, further special figures have 
been appointed ad hoc (such as the Commissario Straordinario for the COVID-19 emergency) 
and purchasing power has also been given to the Civil Defence Department. This fragmentation 
between central entities was preferred to other solutions, such as a more massive reliance on 
entities already active and competent in the procurement sector.  
The greater use of Consip S.p.A., for example, could have incentivized greater coordination 
between purchases, avoiding problems of duplication of human resources and associated costs. 
Furthermore, since this institution is ordinarily in charge of these tasks, the experience and skills 
accumulated could have favoured an even more efficient process. 
Thanks to the data provided by the Italian anti-corruption authority, ANAC, we can see how 
the aggregate expenditure was carried out by all these entities during the emergency (Tab. 4132). 
In this analysis it is useful to distinguish procurement through accordi quadro (framework 
agreements) or conventions from other procurement contracts. 
 
131 Almost all the expenses incurred by the first sector are attributable to the Extraordinary Commissioner. 
132 Figure 3. “Indagine conoscitiva sugli affidamenti in regime emergenziale di forniture e servizi sanitari connessi 












Figure 7. Expenditure Distribution according to the Purchasing Entity
Other Centralized Purchasing Body Non-centralized





From these data, it is clear that the contribution of the main central purchasing body (Consip 
S.p.A.) is relatively low. In particular, if Consip plays a relevant role in procurement through 
framework agreements or conventions, its contribution drops drastically in the management of 
all other types of contracts (1.8%). Overall, one-third of the purchases was managed by Consip 
S.p.A. (in particular for non-health-care procurement). A greater presence of Consip could have 
been expected, given its number of employees and the concentration of skills in the public 
procurement field. 
Furthermore, framework agreements in the emergency phase - when contractual forces change 
significantly and prices with them - do not represent the most important type of contract used, 
despite their importance. Excluding smart-CIG from the total calculation, most of the 
procedures are tender contracts (60.4%),133 for a total absolute value of 3.3 billion euros in two 
months. 
Another important aspect that distinguishes the debate between centralized or decentralized 
procedures is the analysis of the State-Regions relationship. Since this is an emergency that has 
strongly affected the health sector, the regions were able to decide the procurement of some 
goods and services whether to proceed independently or rely on the government.  
The use of central purchasing bodies and other aggregators can be analysed by splitting the 
sample on a regional basis. The choices operated by the Regions has not been homogeneous: 
some have delegated almost all of their, others only a small part. In particular, 7 of them have 
resorted to central purchasing bodies and regional aggregators for less than 1% of the 
 
133 Among these, 37.6% derives from the use of demand aggregation tools (29.8% from accordi quadro and 7.8% 
from conventions). 
Table 4. Expenditure Distribution of Centralized Purchases 
Source: ANAC Report, 13/08/2020 
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expenditure, and 8 for more than 50%. The former may not have taken advantage of the 
economies of scale at the state level deriving from the greater quantities purchased and the more 
bargaining power over the few available suppliers. 
To give a concrete example of the effect of this heterogeneity, ANAC denounces a strong 
variability in the prices paid by different PBs for personal protective equipment, i.e. FFP2 
masks. The price of this medical device ranges from 2.20 euros per item (price paid by the Civil 
Protection Department and Consip S.p.A.) to 7.50 euros paid by the Lazio Region, highlighting 
the potential savings that can be obtained through more homogeneous management for the 
supply of certain goods.134 
This analysis shows that the greater skills are usually concentrated at a central level and, 
especially in situations where quick answers to problems are required, reliance on more 
competent bodies can bring benefits for the performance of public procurement. Centralization 
is often seen as a cause of complexity and lengthening of time due to the bureaucratic and 
administrative process that usually pervades these processes. This emergency provided an 
opportunity to demonstrate the opposite, with 78% of the expenditure occurring centrally 
(ANAC Report, 13/08/2020). 
The relationship between centralization and performance is positive in particular in presence of 
competence and skills. Differently, central delegation does not necessarily make the 
procurement process more efficient. Although most of the public expenditure for the emergency 
in the period March-April 2020 was centralized, the use of different central purchasing bodies 
with different skills still made the overall management more fragmented.135 The (relatively) 
low incidence of Consip S.p.A. is of particular concern. Instead, a large part of the expenditure 
has been delegated to ad hoc figures or entities that do not have the public procurement 
procedures as core business(such as the Civil Protection Department). 
This last section has showed how most of the criticalities that emerged in public procurement - 
both in standard and in emergency conditions - strongly depend on the competence of people 
managing the purchasing process. We assessed the potentiality and criticalities of the 
extraordinary procedures used to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic, one of the most disastrous 
 
134 This heterogeneity can also be found when comparing the expenditure per citizen of the various regions. Starting 
from an average expenditure value of 42.6 euros per capita, the regions that spend the most amount to around 75 
euros (with an exception represented by Tuscany, which reaches 101.2 euros per capita), while the most virtuous 
regions spend between 5 and 10 euros (mainly in Southern Italy). These values must also consider the different 
intensities and the effects with which the emergency initially struck, involving in a more important way the regions 
of Northern Italy. 
135 An example of inefficiencies in the procurement and distribution phase is represented by the case of syringes 
for administering vaccines. In at least two regions (Tuscany and Lombardy) the type of syringes purchased through 
the Commissario Straordinario was found to be wrong in obtaining the six doses of vaccine, which can be extracted 
from each vial. This resulted in the average doses per vial being lowered to 5.5 causing delays in administration. 
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emergencies in recent years. And, as a final focus, we have studied and discussed how the 
competence and discretion of the PBs play a crucial role in the efficiency of the emergency 







4  CONCLUSIONS 
 
This work can be divided into two main parts: the relationship between discretion, competence, 
and rules in standard public procurement processes; and the analysis of COVID-19 procurement 
and how the purchasing process changed according to the pandemic emergency.  
We described the main awarding procedures usually available to the public buyer and their 
main effects on procurement outcomes. Awarding procedures are divided into auctions and 
negotiations. The former allow greater competition among bidders (in particular, open 
procedures) and lead to obtain a lower average price. The latter offers the PB the possibility to 
negotiate with suppliers on multiple aspects, face shorter awarding times and reduce the costs 
of any ex-post renegotiations. 
 
We studied the effects of a selection mechanism that assessed the past performance of bidders, 
in addition to the technical-legal aspects of the offers. Qualification systems based on 
reputational mechanism turns out to be very effective for the contracting authority and for the 
market in general: on the one hand, this tool reduces the overall costs for the PB (the additional 
cost in the selection stage is more than compensated with the reduction in legal disputes and 
ex-post renegotiation costs); on the other hand, this tool produces incentives for firms to invest 
in adapting to the required quality standards and to offer superior quality services. 
 
The reputational mechanism is an example of discretion given to the contracting authority. In 
discussing the literature on the effects of the PB’s greater discretion on procurement outcomes, 
we then refer to the level of competence of the PB. As an empirical result from different 
contributions on public procurement data, it emerged that a higher level of competence leads to 
higher levels of efficiency and effectiveness in public procurement processes, especially when 
a greater degree of discretion is granted to the PB. On the other hand, tightening the rules leads 
to an increase in the performance of CAs with a lower level of competence.  
In the short term, tightening the rules could be the most effective remedy to get better 
procurement outcomes from a not competent PB, along with a strong investment to increase the 
PB’s skills for the management of future procurement. 
 
The incidence of competence is also part of the relationship between discretion and the risk of 
corruption in public procurement. Here, the literature highlights how the emergence of corrupt 
practices is more likely in environments where the PB’s competence is lower: increasing PBs’ 
competence offers important results both in improving the efficiency and effectiveness of public 
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procurement and in creating an important obstacle to the agents’ opportunistic and corrupted 
behaviour. 
 
In the last chapter, we focused on the analysis of public procurement in emergency situations. 
While in standard conditions the degree of discretion left to the PB represents a choice, in 
emergency procurement it often becomes a forced solution to face new and unpredictable 
circumstances. 
Here, we have highlighted how the risk of corruption can increase because of the urgent 
conditions in which the PB operates and because of the stringent timing that hinders the 
effectiveness of normal control systems. Taking a cue from the COVID-19 emergency, we also 
discussed the main effects of the pandemic on the public procurement processes. We have 
noticed a sharp rise in prices and an increase in delivery times, mainly caused by the shock that 
the market has suffered in both the supply and the demand. This has pushed towards a 
centralization of purchases in Italy: on ANAC data, we observed that the centralization did not 
involve only the central purchasing bodies already responsible for the purchase of goods and 
services for the public administration; often the Italian central government has delegated 
purchasing activities also to other bodies - not involved in public procurement processes 
ordinarily - and to specifically appointed new figures. 
In our assessment, this fragmentation could have led to incur in additional costs due to the 
duplication of human resources and procurement procedures. Greater delegation to the already 
existing purchasing bodies – for example to Consip S.p.A., which was specifically created to 
manage public procurement of goods, services and furniture - could have helped in containing 
costs. Consip has managers with a high level of competence and bargaining ability in running 
procurement procedures. Moreover, with delegation to Consip, larger economies of scale in 
purchasing could have been exploited.  
Where purchases have not been centralized, the fragmentation has led to differences between 
Regions in terms of prices and procedures, in particular for health procurement. This outcome 
highlights how centralization would have allowed greater price/quality homogeneity (i.e. lower 
average prices and higher average quality) and coordination in the response to the emergency. 
 
Note that our study considers the first phase of COVID-19 emergency response (March-April 
2020), in which coordination effects referring to the unexpected setting to face could be 
relevant. An overall assessment of the procurement management under the COVID-19 
emergency period in Italy also requires an analysis of the consequences in the medium-long 
term: this is clearly not possible now. The medium-long term analysis will need reliable data to 
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assess the goodness of the PBs’ choices in a period in which rules allow for larger discretion in 
managing the procurement process. In particular, it would be interesting to study the efficiency 
of procurement run by a large contracting authority already present and operative (as Consip at 
national level, or other at regional level) as compared to new ones (as the team conducted by 
the Commissario Straordinario or the Civil Defence Department). This analysis could produce 
interesting evidence on the relevance of PB’s competence in managing emergency 
procurement. 
 
To conclude, we can observe how the trade-off between discretion and rules should not be 
discussed without adequately considering the importance of PB’s competence. Indeed, both in 
standard and in emergency conditions, most of the PB’s inefficiencies belong to a lack of 
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- How does the University's e-procurement system work?  
 
- Is the e-procurement system just a different way of making purchases or does it provide 
for some particularities at the regulatory level? 
 
- Are all purchases managed through e-procurement or through other methods? 
 
- What are the main requirements that suppliers must comply with in their relationship 
with a non-private entity? 
 
- How are purchases managed? Centralizing or delegating to individual departmental 
offices? Are there any thresholds beyond which purchases are centralized? 
 
- What is the relationship with the departments and how can their autonomy be reconciled 
with the need to exploit the potential advantages deriving from centralization? 
 
- If and how does the level of competence affect the public procurement process? 
 
- Does anything change with respect to contracts for works, supplies or services? Does 
anything change compared to the ordinary regulation? 
 
- What are the main criteria used in the selection of the supplier? If and how do they 
change according to the contract value?  
 
- What were the main regulatory and procedural changes as a result of the emergency 
situation? Were they applied on a recurring basis or only partially? 
 
- Have any pre-established agreements (framework agreements) or conventions been 




- What are the main considerations on the effects of the exceptions on timing, purchase 
prices and participation in tenders? 
 
- Which aspects introduced by the derogations would it be desirable to be maintained 
even in standard conditions? 
 
- What are the main problems and criticisms emerged in the management of emergency 
procurement? 
 
- How the relationship with suppliers is changed? 
 
 
